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Press conference of Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina on 8 May 2020

8 May 2020
Speech

Good afternoon, dear colleagues

As usual, I would like to start out this press conference with the Bank of Russia’s assessment of the situation in the economy and financial markets.

Based on the data and indicators published for the last two weeks, we can provide a more comprehensive estimate of how the current restrictions affected the economy in April and early May. These consequences are quite serious. PMI issued this week demonstrates that in manufacturing it decreased to 31 points in April against 47 points in March, and in the services sector this index equalled as little as 12.2 points, after having dropped to 37 in March.

According to the information for 20–24 April on sectoral financial flows and the findings of our weekly business survey, economic activity remained subdued.

Recent statistics on individuals’ expenses for goods and services evidence that the scale of the shrinkage of their purchases is gradually decreasing. This is primarily driven by goods, and to a greater extent by food products, which results from the reduction in the usage of catering services. However, the services sector also showed signs of a slow rise in sales over the past week.

Overall, leading indicators as of the end of April are in line with our forecast of an 8% year-over-year decline of GDP in the second quarter.

Our assumptions are also confirmed by data on inflation and inflation expectations. Inflation is still affected by one-off pro-inflationary factors, due to which annual inflation accelerated from 2.5% in March to 3.1% in April.

However, weekly data offer increasingly more signs that the impact of these factors starts to wane: price growth was 0.15 over the week from 21 through 27 April. This is its minimum since mid-March, although it is still above the pace conforming to our 4% target.

By the end of April, households’ inflation expectations stabilised, after having risen in late March. As before, we estimate the risk of secondary effects associated with one-off pro-inflationary factors as low.

Foreign markets are becoming slightly more optimistic, which is reflected by rising stock indices and prices for goods, including oil, decreasing CDS and yields on emerging market economies’ sovereign bonds, and the strengthening of EMEs’ currencies. After the decline in mid-April, equity markets hit new local highs. Credit spreads also shrank.

It is worth emphasising that oil prices have risen, driven by production cuts within the OPEC+ deal that became effective in May. For the first time since mid-March, the price of our Urals oil has returned to USD 24–25 per barrel, its discount to Brent declining from USD 10–11 in early April to as little as USD 3.5–4 in recent days. This is in line with market expectations regarding the balance of oil supply and demand in the European market as a result of the achieved arrangements and demand recovery after the quarantine restrictions are lifted.

As to the Russian market, it is necessary to take into account the effect of public holidays when overall activity is usually rather low. We can observe that markets remain stable. Specifically, implied volatility in the foreign exchange market has decreased. The corporate bond market has started to open, and there have been first offerings. After the Bank of Russia cut the key rate, yields on federal government bonds continued to go down, almost returning to their February lows.

In recent weeks, the Ministry of Finance has been successfully placing government bonds. Over the second half of April, foreign investors continued to moderately build up their investments, with their share staying stable close to 31%. Investors are interested in Russia’s market since the responsible macroeconomic policy pursued by our country over recent years has created potential for supporting the economy through fiscal policy, including owing to the fiscal rule mechanism.

Public debt remains low compared to other countries, with federal government debt totalling 12.4% of GDP and overall general government debt equalling 13.8% of GDP (less intergovernmental debt). The share of federal government bonds in banks’ balance sheets approximates 4%. This is comparable with and even lower than that in the USA, as well as on average in the euro area and in most East European countries, especially taking into account that, compared to Russia, the non-bank financial sector in these states plays a much more significant role in financing their economies. In other words, Russia does have room for manoeuvre, although it is not unlimited and should be used prudently. 

We have got the first data for April on the banking sector. Its overall performance was quite moderate, except corporate lending where demand remained elevated and Russian companies’ exposure increased by approximately 1.2%. This is below the record 2.6% growth in March, but is notably above the averages observed before the implementation of the restrictions, evidencing companies’ need for bank financing against the background of shrinking money flows and the decline in the bond market.

Conversely, the retail loan portfolio slightly contracted, by about 0.6%. On the one hand, banks are now probably more careful in extending new loans, seeking to avoid losses in the future. On the other hand, individuals themselves might have become more reluctant to raise loans because they feel uncertain whether their incomes will remain stable.

The situation in the household deposit segment improved in April. As opposed to the slight outflow of approximately 1% in March, preliminary data as of the end of April show that funds in individuals’ accounts increased by nearly 0.8%. Contrastingly, corporate funds shrank by about 1.4%. However, this reduction was offset by the inflow of government funds.

Today, I would like to dwell on the issue of banking sector liquidity. This is currently a matter of wide concern because the surplus has substantially contracted since the beginning of the year, specifically from 2.8 trillion rubles as of early 2020 to 1.4 trillion rubles.

There are several reasons behind the decline in the surplus of liquidity.

Firstly, this is higher demand for cash. In the situation of uncertainty about the duration of the self-isolation period, a large number of individuals have preferred to stock up with cash. Simultaneously, observing rising demand for cash rubles, banks themselves have been seeking to increase the amount of cash in their cash offices and ATMs in order to be confident that they are capable to satisfy this elevated demand. We expect that a considerable portion of this cash will return to banks as the restrictions are gradually cancelled.

The second reason is that the announced non-work days have altered the conventional crediting and debiting schedule of corporate clients. This situation is making it more complicated for banks to forecast their liquidity flows. Therefore, a lot of banks prefer to maintain liquidity buffers in their correspondent accounts, rather than offer liquidity in the money market. As a result, the distribution of liquidity is becoming increasingly more uneven since those banks that are facing a local liquidity deficit are not capable to fully cover it using interbank lending.

Being aware of this temporary rise in demand for liquidity, the Bank of Russia has been holding fine-tuning repo auctions since March, expanding opportunities for credit institutions to manage their own liquidity.

Our recent repo auction took place this Wednesday where banks raised nearly 800 billion rubles. Moreover, the situation in the money market has stabilised. Last week, interbank lending rates were above the key rate, but this week interbank lending rates are again slightly below the key rate, which is typical of the structural liquidity surplus.

Another recent trend of banks’ liquidity is reducing maturities of borrowings. Even before the pandemic, we were talking of an increasing disbalance between assets and liabilities in terms of their maturities. Long-term lending has been expanding, with the share of up to one-year deposits being high. This trend has intensified over recent months since companies and the Federal Treasury have been placing their deposits with banks for shorter periods. The disbalance may worsen even further due to loan repayment holidays granted by banks to households and businesses.

However, this disbalance should not limit banks’ capabilities to restructure loans and issue new long-term loans. To this end, we are temporarily launching a longer-term refinancing instrument.

Long-term repos are planned to be settled for one month and one year. Auctions will be held on a monthly basis, and all banks that already have the opportunity to conduct repos with the Bank of Russia may take part in them.

Amid the surplus of liquidity, the Bank of Russia is pursuing countercyclical policy raising collateral quality requirements.

Given objectively higher risks on long-term operations, we are going to accept only the most reliable assets, specifically federal government bonds and bonds of constituent territories of the Russian Federation and municipalities with the highest credit rating assigned according to the national scale. It is essential to stress that we will be accepting any issues of federal government bonds as collateral, and not only new ones.

The interest rate on one-year repos will be floating, changing depending on the key rate. Thus, these repos will not impact interest rates in the economy, and the Bank of Russia will maintain the possibility to achieve its operational objective, that is, the convergence of the money market rate with the key rate. In aggregate, this will secure the normal functioning of the money market without distorting the effect of market mechanisms.

Combined with short-term deposit operations of the Bank of Russia, repos will not alter the overall surplus in the system, but will improve the structure of banks’ liabilities by extending their maturities.

According to our preliminary plan, we are going to hold the first one-month repo auction at the end of May and the one-year repo — at the end of June.

I will now speak on the progress of the measures aiming to support the economy.

The amount of restructuring has been growing. The ratio of considered requests and approvals to the number of requests received has also been rising. By the moment, small and medium-sized enterprises have submitted nearly 94,000 applications, including 20,000 after 22 April. The percentage of approvals remains stable, equalling 75–77%. Moreover, we can observe that banks have streamlined their procedures and are now considering requests faster. Restructured loans to SMEs total 343 billion rubles.

Individuals have submitted 1.4 million loan restructuring applications, including nearly 400,000 after 22 April. Mortgage loans have the highest percentage of approved requests for loan repayment holidays pursuant to law — 80%, while car loans have the smallest proportion of approvals — approximately 20%.

I would like to add a few remarks on whether loan repayment holidays will be efficient to maintain borrowers’ solvency. Of course, it is impossible to predict the future, but I would like to provide the following promising figures. We have recently completed the monitoring of the efficiency of the standard mortgage repayment holidays introduced last summer. According to the findings, after the end of their holidays, 76% of the borrowers have managed to properly resume their repayments. This means that this respite for individuals is really efficient because it does not create bad loans, but rather prevents them.

Now, I would like to speak on the progress of the 0% wage loan programme. According to the Ministry of Economic Development, already 20 banks have joined this programme as of 8 May and are actively participating in it. Over the past two weeks, the amount of loan agreements concluded increased two-fold, with approved requests (they are already numbering 20,000) totalling 46 billion rubles. These are quite good figures evidencing that the programme is gradually advancing to expected amounts.

More details on restructuring and preferential lending, as well as other data on our assessment of the current situation are provided in the Financial Pulse review to be published tonight.

Over recent weeks, the macroeconomic situation has been changing more slowly. Therefore, we will be carrying out our regular press conferences more rarely, while continuing to issue our weekly reviews Financial Pulse and Monitoring of Sectoral Financial Flows based on the payment system data. The next press conference is scheduled in two weeks and will take place on 22 May.

Q&A for the Media

QUESTION from Reuters:

If economic activity continues to decline in May — June, just as in April, is the Bank of Russia ready to consider a greater key rate reduction than 50 basis points at its meeting in June when the annual repo mechanism is to be launched?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

First of all, I would like to stress that our decision on the key rate does not in any way depend on the launch of the annual repo. We are really going to commence it, and I have already explained the reasons behind this. As to the pace of changes in the key rate, I would like to note that at its recent meeting the Board of Directors also considered the possibility to decrease the key rate by 100 basis points. I admit that if the situation is unfolding in the future as it is at the moment, we will also consider the option of cutting the key rate by 100 basis points, but of course among all other alternatives. As usual, in making our decision, we will assess the entire range of factors, the situation as a whole, and our forecasts of economic developments and inflation. We will also take into account and estimate how the financial system and banks will be adjusting to greater changes in the key rate, given that they have a large percentage of both loans and deposits granted or placed at fixed interest rates. Our decision will be based on all the above.

QUESTION from RBC:

Given that the Bank of Russia has started to ease its monetary policy, how probable is it that the key rate will drop below the level of inflation? Can it stay at such levels for quite a long period of time?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

The experience of a range of countries shows that the key rate may be beneath inflation. Generally, this may be observed in economies where inflation is below targets. Key rates in these countries may be close to zero or even negative so that inflation may be returned back to targets already from beneath. However, we will be making our decision taking into account the impact of various factors in our economy. We will determine the key rate and its path so that inflation stays close to 4%.

QUESTION from Kommersant:

Does the Bank of Russia assume any changes in budget spending compared to the amounts scheduled for 2020–2021? Are they influencing the Bank of Russia’s forecasts and in which way?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

Of course, fiscal policy does influence the Bank of Russia’s forecasts, and we always take this into account. We can see that budget parameters are changing and may continue to do so in the future since the situation is unfolding and the Government is considering additional economic support measures rather promptly. In our forecast reviewed at the Board of Directors’ last meeting on the key rate and in other forecasts, we rely on the already approved budget decisions and we have taken them into account. At the same time, we are aware that there can be additional expenses, and we will certainly update budget parameters. At the moment, we forecast that this year Russia’s budget deficit may reach 5–6% of GDP, and oil and gas revenues will also decline, which will be offset by using the resources of the National Wealth Fund and non-oil and gas revenues. There may also be extra expenses. The situation is developing this way because the country needs really large-scale measures to combat the coronavirus pandemic. We will be adjusting our estimates, but I would like to emphasise, and have already said this, that overall we — the Bank of Russia, our country, and the economy — do have room for manoeuvre in this regard.

QUESTION from Bloomberg:

How is the material slowdown in oil production within the OPEC+ deal contributing to the decline in economic growth, given that the oil industry is a key one? How many percentage points of the GDP decrease the oil industry accounts for?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

Oil production is indeed a key industry in Russia’s economy, and our preliminary estimates show that the contribution of oil production cuts to the GDP decline may total up to 1 percentage point. This figure does not factor in the impact on related industries. However, if we want to estimate the overall effect of the OPEC+ deal, it is essential to note that this decline could have been more significant if this agreement had not been concluded. Yet, the oil production decline is expected to slow down in 2021 and 2022, and this will undoubtedly influence GDP already in a positive way.

QUESTION from Interfax:

Is it worth revising the cut-off price within the fiscal rule, in your opinion? Are there any discussions on this issue taking place now? Probably, there is another discussion about limiting the threshold of the cut-off price? Which threshold is currently relevant? Which level of the cut-off price would ensure the full efficiency of the fiscal rule?

QUESTION from RBC:

Is it critical to terminate the annual indexation of the cut-off price under the fiscal rule, as it was suggested by Mr Siluanov? When it reaches USD 44 per barrel in 2022, the threshold will be too high. Do you agree with this idea?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

First of all, I would like to emphasise that we have always held that the very content and essence of the fiscal rule should under no circumstances be altered. We can see how it works. Right now, we are taking advantage of the fiscal rule in place. Owing to the fiscal rule, we have accumulated the resources of the National Wealth Fund that may be used to offset the decline in oil and gas revenues for the budget. This is a major asset. Therefore, the fiscal rule itself should definitely be preserved. Any serious change in the cut-off price is currently an irrelevant issue, in my opinion. The issue of its indexation or a reduction in the indexation could probably be discussed. However, I believe that in current conditions it would be irrational to substantially revise its levels.

As to the indexation, we will be adjusting the parameters of the fiscal rule if there are any serious changes in how the situation is unfolding, but there is no need in this at the moment.

QUESTION from Vedomosti:

Do you think it would be reasonable to include the countercyclical capital buffer into the fiscal rule, which would make it possible to increase Russia’s public debt in 2020 and 2021? Which level of public debt does the Bank of Russia consider economically viable and secure in order to overcome this crisis? Is the Bank of Russia going to directly participate in the redemption of public debt?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

I believe, and I have just said this, that the fiscal rule proves to be efficient. That is true, there are ideas that the rule may be improved and streamlined, and comprise countercyclical capital buffers not linked to oil price movements. However, I think that it would be too early to speak of this in the current situation, and it would be unreasonable to complexify the effect of the fiscal rule right now.

As to Russia’s public debt, it is really rather low. Its amount is one of the lowest worldwide. Therefore, we do have room and possibilities to increase our public debt to a certain extent. However, our small public debt is our competitive advantage enabling us to remain sustainable and steady regardless of changes in the external environment. This ensures greater stability and security of our economy. Nonetheless, a slight increase in public debt is possible. This is currently under discussion, but this should be done prudently.

The Bank of Russia is not going to directly participate in the redemption of the public debt and does not consider this possible. Of course, there are countries that do so, but these are generally those economies that have already exhausted all other opportunities to implement and approve standard monetary policy measures and where key rates are already close to zero or even negative. Russia does not have such a problem, which is why the Bank of Russia does not need to directly participate in the redemption of public debt.

QUESTION from TASS Agency:

Does the Bank of Russia have any estimate of how many banks may suspend dividend payouts this year amid the current economic crisis?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

At the moment, we do not have such an estimate, but I believe that banks themselves are currently scrutinising the situation and assessing their financial standing and possible losses in the future. We have recommended that banks postpone dividend payouts and consider this issue at the end of August — September, and generally banks follow these recommendations. Banks should estimate their potential future losses and the amount of additional capital required to cover them, and make a decision either to reduce dividend payouts, or not to pay out dividends at all, which would be totally reasonable in order to preserve and increase their capital, including for lending to the economy during the period of its recovery. However, I think that banks will be making these decisions closer to autumn.

QUESTION from Banki.ru:

To which extent may overdue household loans increase? When is this peak expected? Is this growth jeopardising the sustainability of the banking system?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

As you know, today’s circumstances have not yet fully reflected in figures, and banks’ balance sheets do not yet show them to the fullest extent. To begin with, loans are being restructured, and we have granted various relaxations enabling banks to extend the period of time when they should recognise their losses. A part of borrowers — and I have already provided relevant statistics on mortgage loans — will resume their repayments according to the normal schedule, and probably banks will not even need additional provisioning. However, this is to be estimated later on, and of course it will eventually be necessary to record the quality of assets and losses in banks’ balance sheets. This will be done because the regulatory easing is temporary. These relaxations have been implemented to provide more time to banks. However, the peak when this increase already becomes obvious is expected approximately in the second half of this year, or probably at the beginning of the next year. As of the moment, the increase in overdue loans is insignificant.

As to the impact on banks’ capital and their stability, we do not expect it to be material. Why so? In the first place, banks have capital cushions, their buffers that they may use when needed, including in relation to consumer loans. Banks’ buffers accumulated in this area total approximately 500 billion rubles. We have released the buffer for mortgage loans, but it may still be used for consumer loans. This amount slightly exceeds 500 billion rubles. Therefore, we believe that banks can use these funds. In addition, banks earned significant profit last year and at the beginning of this year, and they may use all these funds to increase their capital. Banks will definitely maintain their stability.

QUESTION from Interfax:

Deputies have devised amendments that would enable the Board of Directors of the Deposit Insurance Agency to reduce the rates of contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund post factum. Are you going to use this regulatory provision and establish decreased rates not beginning from the third quarter, as it was announced, but from the first quarter?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

That is true, such amendments have been prepared. We are grateful to deputies for their response to our request. The Bank of Russia’s Board of Directors approved the decision to cut the rates of contributions to the Deposit Insurance Agency, but they have a time lag effect pursuant to the effective legislation. We believe that when the key rate is cut, the rate of these contributions could be reduced immediately or even retrospectively. If this law is adopted, we will definitely take advantage of it.

QUESTION from Izvestia:

How was the banking sector’s interest income changing in April? Has it declined?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

At the moment, it is hard to estimate this based on April data. We still do not have comprehensive statistics, but we will assess these numbers later. Currently, we only have quarterly estimates. However, preliminary data and the survey of banks show that their interest income will certainly decrease. This is absolutely normal in the current situation: there will be a decline in banks’ interest and non-interest income, and in their profit, as well.

QUESTION from RIA Novosti:

Andrey Belousov stated that the limit under the zero percent wage loan programme would be drawn down as early as mid-May. To which extent may the Bank of Russia increase the limit under this programme? How do you assess the level to which VEB.RF’s limits should be raised within this programme? What can be done to expand the range of participants in this programme from the current 15 banks?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

Although it seemed that this programme was failing to gain traction after its launch, it has picked up momentum by now. Currently, applications received total approximately 94 billion rubles. Moreover, these are not only requests from small and medium-sized enterprises, but also from large businesses (the Government also included large companies into the programme). We allocated the limit of 150 billion rubles to SMEs when we established the limit under our programme supporting the governmental programme currently implemented at 3.5% rate, which is 2 percentage points below the key rate. At the moment, we are considering the option and will probably approve the relevant decision next week to additionally increase the limit by nearly 50 billion rubles taking into account large businesses. In addition, we would like to separate these limits for SMEs to be also embraced. Overall, the decision on the programme should undoubtedly be made jointly with the Government.

QUESTION from public TV and radio company Kaliningrad:

Is it possible to ease the terms of preferential lending to businesses? Specifically, companies are facing the collateral issue because the list of acceptable collateral is limited. Could banks make concessions if the Bank of Russia influences them?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

We have programmes established by law. These are governmental programmes, and they do not provide for collateral. However, banks do have the right to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness when they issue loans (whether at standard or preferential interest rates) since banks also have liabilities on deposits, and we should remember this. Thus, they certainly assess borrowers’ creditworthiness, and collateral is one of the ways to improve this assessment. Therefore, in this case it is necessary to communicate with different banks because their requirements and risk appetite vary. The Bank of Russia does not influence banks in this regard. This is their own business policy.

QUESTION from TASS Agency:

A range of banks seem reluctant to follow the Bank of Russia’s recommendations on how to work with clients in the conditions of the quarantine. Specifically, some of them do not accept expired bank cards, and others refuse to open bank accounts remotely. How is the Bank of Russia going to respond to this?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

That is true, we have provided our recommendations on these issues, but we may not oblige banks to follow them, since we do not have the relevant powers. However, the option of remote account opening was requested by banks themselves in order to support mortgage lending, and a lot of banks are taking advantage of this option. As to the acceptance of expired bank cards, I believe that this is really critical for people to avoid visits to bank offices in order to receive new cards. We can see that a number of banks issue new cards automatically and send them directly to individuals. At the moment, we do not observe any large-scale issues in this regard. We will continue our monitoring and communication with banks in order to intensify remote servicing if this is in demand among clients and to encourage banks to accept expired cards. I would like to repeat that banks are already doing this now.

QUESTION from Financial One:

What can you say about the progress of the draft law on qualified investors? Will it be adopted in the near future or will the work on this draft law be suspended for a while?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

I believe that this law is important, and we do have a lot of ongoing issues, which is why measures should be taken promptly. Many banks and financial institutes are taking actions to adjust their processes in these new conditions. However, there are system-level and principal matters, and we should definitely address them. The Bank of Russia does not intend to suspend such decisions, and we continue to work on them, including the law on qualified investors. Moreover, I believe that the problem of protection of the rights and interests of non-qualified investors remains relevant. We can see that Russian citizens are still interested in financial and investment accounts and various financial instruments. Therefore, this problem is still urgent. We will continue to work on this issue jointly with the State Duma.

QUESTION from Reuters:

Have the major state-owned banks Sberbank or VTB already used anti-crisis support measures, and should they now postpone their dividend and bonus payouts to their management?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

First of all, I am not going to comment on the operation of any particular banks. As you know, we never do this. However, we are monitoring how banks are making use of regulatory relaxations, that is, so called anti-crisis measures. Different measures are being used differently, and we have relevant statistics. Nonetheless, as long as banks have their capital cushions, and they do have them, banks do not employ the measures that would require a reduction in dividends and bonuses. We will continue to control this issue so as to ensure that banks always have sufficient capital. If needed, banks will apply these anti-crisis measures and regulatory relaxations. For instance, banks are rather intensely employing the relaxations on foreign currency and securities.

QUESTION from Izvestia:

The Prime Minister and several federal officials have the coronavirus. In this regard, is the Bank of Russia making tests for its management and employees, and if so, are there any positive tests? How many Bank of Russia employees continue to work at offices?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

We are really doing our best in the situation of the spreading pandemic for our employees to stay healthy; we are taking all necessary sanitary and epidemiological measures, and are certainly making tests. However, our organisation is large, and unfortunately, there are confirmed cases of the coronavirus. They are numbering about 100, mostly in Moscow, but at the moment our staff in Moscow totals nearly 10,000 persons. Moreover, this number includes cases among those employees who switched to remote work quite a long time by now. We are actively applying the remote work mode. Nearly 80% of our headquarters’ employees are working remotely now. In regional divisions, this percentage is a little lower, probably equalling 60–65%. We believe that this is crucial in the current situation. In addition, we have launched a shift work mode for our critical functions. This work is isolated, including from the external environment, in order to secure the continuity of our key functions under any circumstances.

QUESTION from RIA Novosti:

Food inflation hit its 2008 highs in April. Do you expect the situation to improve in May?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

The growth of food prices was really very high in April, and this is quite natural and predictable when demand for food products is elevated. Conversely, non-food prices rose to a much lesser extent, and the growth of prices for services was very low, equalling 0.1% as far as I remember. We do believe that the situation will be gradually changing. Moreover, food inflation in April was also driven by a seasonal shrinkage of fruit, vegetable and food stocks, as well as by the ruble depreciation which affected prices for food imports. In our opinion, food prices were one of the pro-inflationary components. Nonetheless, we can see that disinflationary factors will generally prevail further on, which will influence food inflation, among other things, and it will go down.

QUESTION from TASS Agency:

Previously, you said that the Bank of Russia may expand the list of categories for reducing acquiring fees. Are there any specific decisions on this issue at the moment?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

I can say that we have really reduced the acquiring fee, first and foremost for online stores since this is most requested. Generally, as you know, the topic of acquiring fees has been discussed for a long time already. In order to find a successful solution to this issue, we are actively enhancing the Faster Payments System offering much lower fees. However, the acquiring fee is now becoming a sensitive element for the retail network, and more. We have a large number of requests, including from healthcare organisations. We are going to scrutinise this issue since it requires further discussions, and we will primarily take into account its social importance.

QUESTION from Bloomberg:

Today, a considerable portion of non-food retail stores are closed. Services related to transport and tourism or involving personal contact have significantly altered or are not rendered at all. How do you estimate inflation trends under these conditions? Do you have any concerns about possible distortions of results in this situation?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

There are really certain difficulties in measuring inflation, and they are natural when demand for a range of products declines or a range of services are not provided at all. For instance, we are now estimating inflation expectations in a new way — through telephone surveys. Therefore, inflation expectations may not be totally comparable. Unfortunately, this is the reality. However, we are carefully monitoring information disclosed by Rosstat. It comprises over 500 inflation components, and now they behave differently. For example, we have already spoken of food inflation which is rather high. We are going to scrutinise all these components in order to comprehend how prices are changing in different categories. Nonetheless, we expect that this situation is temporary, and such distortion of data will not become a systemic problem. We will be working with the information available.

QUESTION from Interfax:

Is it true that the Bank of Russia has supported deputies’ idea for banks to rely their decisions regarding loan repayment holidays on outstanding debt, and not on initial loan amounts?

ELVIRA NABIULLINA:

In the first place, we do see a certain problem in this regard since individuals have been complaining about banks’ refusals in law-based loan restructuring and these complaints are often associated with the fact that when the Government established loan restructuring thresholds, many people assumed that they are for outstanding debt, and not for initial loan amounts. This problem does exist, and we share concerns about it with deputies, but the solution to this problem should be discussed jointly with the Government.

I would now like to thank you. There are no more questions at the moment.
I wish you good health and best luck and congratulate you on the coming anniversary of the Victory!

See you next time.