• 12 Neglinnaya Street, Moscow, 107016 Russia
  • 8 800 300-30-00
  • www.cbr.ru
What do you want to find?

Elvira Nabiullina’s speech at plenary session of State Duma on Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2027–2029

12 November 2026
Speech

Good afternoon, dear deputies. Good afternoon, Mr Volodin.

Today, I will present the Monetary Policy Guidelines to you in accordance with the law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. This document shows what the Bank of Russia will do to protect the ruble and ensure price stability, which is its statutory mandate. The circumstances surrounding our efforts to achieve this objective remain challenging. However, this does not make it any less important for our people’s welfare and sustainable economic growth.

My presentation today is essentially a continuation of the discussions we had as part of the working group, at the meeting of the committees, and particularly during our meetings with the factions. A direct dialogue with deputies helps us better understand what households and businesses are currently concerned about and what we can do in the present circumstances. We have also heard constructive criticism and we are always receptive to it. During these meetings, we were presented with specific proposals across various areas of our work and took a number of them forward. In addition, we received over 100 written questions from deputies and tried our best to give substantive answers. I would like to thank the deputies, including those who we are only starting to work with, for their professional and well-informed questions.

What were the main topics of these questions?

First, you asked about what the Bank of Russia can do to support economic growth.

The second question was how to help households and businesses get more affordable loans for developing as well as achieving life goals and addressing challenges.

The third one was asked particularly frequently and pointed to the fact that price growth is, to a great extent, fuelled by factors that are not in any way related to demand, that is, factors that the Bank of Russia cannot influence, namely taxes, housing and utility rates, the recycling fee, sanctions, attacks on oil refineries, and a larger budget deficit. This prompts a question: how can the key rate alone help curtail price growth?

I would like to answer this last one straight away. No, we cannot eliminate the root causes affecting production capacity and costs with the key rate. Yet, what we can, and I believe must, do is mitigate the consequences and prevent them from escalating into galloping inflation. We must avoid a situation where all difficulties are ultimately borne by consumers having to deal with soaring prices.

It is our common goal to prevent inflation from accelerating. The Bank of Russia does not work alone to achieve this goal. The key rate affects credit supply and, consequently, demand. Simultaneously, the Russian Government is working to remove bottlenecks that are holding back the expansion of supply of goods and services. Together, we are moving towards our common goal, having a clear understanding what each of us can and must do. Here you can see my colleagues, Mr Volodin and Mr Siluanov, as well as representatives of ministries and government agencies with whom we maintain regular contact. We discuss strategic crossroads and challenges facing economic policy in general.

What do hard data say about the state of the economy?

As you can see, while the situation is different from sector to sector, the economy embarked on an upward path overall in 2026 H2. We expect GDP growth of up to 1% at year end. This is even despite a temporary reduction in production capacity in certain industries as a result of the attacks. But for this factor, economic growth in 2026 would certainly have been higher.

What are the main drivers of this growth? Machine building is one of the sectors supporting the economy, but not only via defence industries. Another factor is the rise in household incomes and consumption and, consequently, the upturn in retail trade and other industries focused on domestic demand.

Recent data suggest that the economy’s growth rates will be increasing steadily further on. Without any doubt, much depends on the time it will take to restore production capacity damaged as a result of the attacks. The Government and businesses are doing everything they can to recover and protect these facilities as fast as possible.

By the way, deputies raised the question of whether the Bank of Russia can help with these efforts as protection requires significant investment. We have made targeted adjustments to banking regulation, easing it to create incentives for banks to issue loans for protecting production facilities and infrastructure from attacks.

Let us now turn to what is happening with investment in general.

This topic accounted for at least a third, if not half, of the questions received from deputies. This is understandable, though, as everyone is concerned about the decline in investment.

Fixed capital investment totalled ₽43 trillion over the 12 months through June 2026 for which statistics are available (data for 2026 Q3 will not be released until late November). In monetary terms, this is even slightly higher than last year. However, in terms of physical quantities, units, and tonnes, there was a decrease by approximately 10% in 2026 H1.

Prices for investment goods are rising even faster than those for products in the consumer basket, which is also a manifestation of high inflation, only this time affecting businesses. This brings us to the question of what the Bank of Russia can do for economic growth. By reducing inflation, we help ensure that businesses do not overpay heavily for equipment. This is critical for delivering on the task set by the Russian President, which is to restart the investment cycle. As you can understand, investment expenditure and additional financing (whether subsidised or market-based) should not translate into higher project costs.

I would like to emphasise that the downturn in investment that we are talking about does not mean that investment activity has come to a halt, as is sometimes claimed. The physical volume of investment remains substantially, 25%, higher than before 2022. The economy is operating at full capacity, ramping up output and continuing to build a foundation for the future. Furthermore, investment activity has been growing over the past two quarters, after reaching its low in 2026 Q1. Next year, we expect investment to increase not only in ruble terms, but also in physical volume, largely because the real economy’s profit (which has always been and will be the main source of investment) remains substantial.

The total profit across all real-economy sectors came in at ₽25 trillion over the past 12 months. That is, enterprises earn around ₽2 trillion per month, which is 10% less than last year, but still enough to invest in expanding production. Nevertheless, I have to say that the situation varies from sector to sector.

Credit makes a significant contribution to investment activity and the economy’s development.

Over the past 12 months, banks have provided ₽13 trillion in financing to companies. These are both loans and corporate bonds purchased by banks, which are also essentially loans.

Importantly, the said ₽13 trillion represents an increase in financing, i.e. the amount on top of what was extended as part of refinancing existing loans. It is sometimes suggested that the increase is primarily accounted for by refinancing operations but that is not the case, – this is credit growth. Total new loans were, of course, much larger. Specifically, businesses additionally raise about ₽1 trillion from banks per month. Notably, the increase is distributed evenly across borrowers from different sectors. So, ₽1 trillion coupled with ₽2 trillion of profit a month is a substantial resource. Do businesses have long-term money?

On the slide, you can see a proportion that remains virtually the same year after year. In banks’ corporate portfolio, around three-fourths of fixed-term loans have been and are issued for over a year. Perhaps, these loans cannot exactly be called long-term money. If we only consider loans for more than three years, which can definitely serve as investment loans, they account for ₽49 trillion, or 56%.

This raises the following question. Overall, the real economy has some resources, with the profit of ₽25 trillion and credit growth by over ₽1 trillion per month. But most importantly, the amount of investment is almost 25% higher than five years ago. Then why has labour productivity in the Russian economy increased by only 5% over these five years? The difference is striking. Apparently, the issue is not only and not so much about access to finance and investment volumes, but rather about how they are distributed. It is important to understand who should receive support and what kind of support, as well as to ensure that financing is provided to those showing productivity growth, rather than those failing to achieve it.

By the way, there have been a lot of questions as to whether subsidised financing can be introduced in this or that industry or segment. The desire to help enterprises is understandable. In fact, over recent years, lending at subsidised rates has risen considerably. According to our estimates, the amount of such loans has approached ₽19 trillion, which accounts for 14% of all ruble loans to the economy. Mortgages constitute the largest part of these loans, effectively serving to subsidise housing construction through increasing demand. However, subsidised lending to companies has also surged over the past five years. Therefore, we believe that multiplying subsidised lending programmes is a non-viable option, both because it raises the burden on the budget and because we want market-based rates to be affordable to everyone, not just to an exclusive group of those having access to subsidised lending. A large volume of subsidised loans is one of the reasons behind the high key rate that has to have a stronger restraining effect on market-based lending.

Subsidised loans, as any forms of subsidies, fall within the Government’s remit. In my opinion, those billions and trillions of rubles that are channelled through various subsidies should be, to a greater extent, oriented towards productivity growth. Demand support, which we regularly resorted to in the past, is only reasonable when the economy faces insufficient aggregate demand and high unemployment. This was indeed a pressing problem in 2008–2009, 2014–2015, and 2020. Now, however, this is definitely not the case.

Next, I will talk about mortgages where the proportion of subsidised lending is contracting. Certainly, households, and deputies, are worried, as market-based rates are still high in this segment.

Nevertheless, the increase in mortgage lending over the past 12 months amounts to ₽2.5 trillion. This figure is higher than last year’s and higher than in 2024 in monetary terms. However, the amount of new loans is probably even more important as funding to buy housing is provided precisely through them rather than through the increase in the credit portfolio. Over the past 12 months, new mortgages reached ₽5.4 trillion, also exceeding the level of the previous two years. Notably, market-based mortgage lending is playing an increasingly significant role, with its share in new loans doubling year on year. That is, mortgages, including market-based ones, serve as a source of funding for construction.

However, in my view, the most important thing here is that people want affordable housing in the first place, rather than affordable mortgages. As for housing affordability, it depends not only on the interest rate, but also on the price per square metre and essentially the amount of debt that people have to take on. I repeat: subsidised programmes have made mortgages very affordable for eligible households, but this benefit has been largely, if not entirely, offset by price growth. Moreover, housing affordability simply plummeted for those who were not eligible for subsidised lending. After the non-targeted subsidised mortgage programme was cancelled, prices have no longer been rising so rapidly, with their growth rate almost halving.

Certainly, many households have to postpone purchasing a home, as both housing and mortgages are expensive now. The path towards affordable market-based mortgages lies through low inflation. As for subsidised mortgage programmes, I believe they should be strictly targeted.

Now, about inflation.

When speaking before deputies, both last year and in March 2026, I said that inflation had substantially decreased from its peak levels. At the time, we hoped to bring it back to 4% as soon as 2026. Price growth decelerated through May, even considering the spike in prices resulting from the increase in the VAT, housing and utility rates, and the recycling fee. Thus, we were able to continue cutting the key rate, which has decreased from 21% to 14% since summer 2025.

Alas, the situation became more challenging this summer.

Petrol became more expensive, prompting an accelerated rise in prices for a wide range of goods and services.

The second factor that we took into account was the Government’s decision to delay the return to a zero-deficit budget. There is a direct link here. Additional money enters the economy through two main channels – bank loans and the budget. If more money comes through the budget channel, then its inflow through the credit channel should be reduced to prevent money supply growth from outpacing the economy’s capacity to produce goods and services.

Considering all these new circumstances, we have adopted a more cautious approach. Therefore, we had to slow the pace of key rate cuts.

In this regard, I would like to remind you how the key rate works. When we are urged to lower it sharply, the expectation is that loan rates will automatically decline as well. This would indeed happen, provided that inflation and inflation expectations are low and there is confidence that inflation will remain low in the long run. When none of the above factors are present (as is the case now), the result is likely to be the opposite. Short-term loan rates might decrease following a key rate cut, but prices will go up immediately, while long-term loans will first rise sharply in cost and then might disappear altogether. As you will recall, when inflation was very high, people were saving in foreign currency, rather than in rubles. Companies were raising loans abroad, from countries offering low interest rates, which were precisely the ones with low inflation. However, foreign financing is unavailable now. Therefore, it is all the more important for us to achieve low inflation in Russia to create affordable domestic credit resources. That is, we have to ensure the same conditions of low inflation and moderate interest rates in the Russian economy as in other countries. This is essential for a strong and resilient domestic economy.

The factor that continues to constrain economic growth is labour shortages.

When there were available workers in the economy, the latter had the capacity to grow on account of a rise in the number of employed people. Yet, in 2024, this source of growth was almost completely exhausted, which is evident from the exceptionally low unemployment rate. Predictably, economic growth has also become more subdued, and the economy can grow further only on the back of higher labour productivity. As I said earlier, the growth rates of the latter are still low.

Certainly, there are many examples of staff cutbacks, for instance, in wood processing and ferrous metallurgy. In addition, large carmakers switched to a four-day working week at times. Staff reductions and downtime are problems, of course, but they are decreasing. The lowest point of the slowdown in demand and economic activity has already been passed in these sectors, which, according to our estimates, happened in 2026 Q1.

Contrastingly, companies in non-ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals are still actively seeking new employees. Industrial production, construction, logistics, and trade – in all of these key sectors, the proportion of companies experiencing labour shortages is higher than the share of those with sufficient staff or workers on idle time.

What is essentially happening now is a shift of employees from one sector or enterprise to another where demand for labour is higher. By the way, this is one of the main drivers of labour productivity growth. Low unemployment levels evidence that workers who leave one company find jobs at others. In my view, the main objective here is not to hamper this shift and thereby support the structural transformation of the economy and help raise labour productivity in the economy as a whole.

The ruble exchange rate is another constant concern for Russian businesses.

As you may recall, initially, many were worried that the exchange rate would weaken sharply. By contrast, last year, both exporters and companies that compete strongly with importers started complaining about the ruble being too strong. Both businesses and exporters constantly urge us to take opposite measures in this regard, depending on the industry they represent. Our position is that the ruble exchange rate should be determined not by the needs of selective industries (as all sectors are important for the economy), but rather by export and import flows and the attractiveness of the ruble as a store of value. This is the only way for the foreign currency channel to work as a force that strengthens the economy.

Yet, all of us would certainly prefer the ruble to fluctuate within a narrower range. Considering the present circumstances and all the sanctions, the current range of its movements does not appear excessive. Still, how can we make the exchange rate more stable? There is a common rule: the lower the inflation rate, the more stable the national currency, all else being equal. This is an indisputable fact confirmed by the decades-long history of many countries.

We expect to reach the 4% inflation target next year.

This is our baseline forecast. It also assumes a gradual acceleration in economic growth and a steady, yet cautious, key rate reduction. The key rate will reach its neutral range of 7.5–8.5% in 2029.

An important prerequisite for the above is a gradual decrease in the deficit, which is assumed in the draft budget. Certainly, it matters in its own right, primarily for the long-term sustainability of our finances, but it also opens up opportunities to step up lending, without creating risks of faster price growth. It is not a coincidence that, in our forecast, the key rate decreases to its neutral level simultaneously with the budget returning to balance.

This is according to our baseline forecast. Surely, life is much more complex than any forecast could ever predict, which is why we always explore several alternative scenarios to be prepared for all. This is required by both our experience and law.

One of the scenarios is disinflationary. It is based on more optimistic assumptions that we will be able to raise labour productivity and address problems in the labour market faster. Naturally, inflation will also be declining more rapidly in this case, and the key rate will drop below 10% as soon as next year.

Two other scenarios show our plans of action under less favourable conditions. Without going into too much detail, I should say that the faster price growth, the larger the budget deficit, and the longer the recovery of Russian enterprises – the higher the key rate path will be.

To conclude, I would like to go back to the questions of deputies that I mentioned at the beginning.

To put it simply: the key rate has been high for three years already and will remain high for a certain period of time. Is such a policy justified in terms of its benefits for the economy, households, and businesses? I am absolutely certain that it is. This is a tough period, but we have no other choice.

First of all, we have a common goal – to ensure growth of people’s welfare. To this end, the Government is doing its part, while we are doing ours. Moderate, predictable price growth is exactly what our contribution to people’s welfare looks like. It sometimes gets obscured by other issues, but rising prices for products and essential services always hit people hard. Households want mortgage rates to be moderate again. Businesses are waiting for loans to become affordable. A country where everything increases in price continuously and unpredictably is doomed to be vulnerable. Only a country with low inflation may expect interest rates to be moderate, national currency to be stable, and investment in its future to be sufficient.

Dear deputies and Mr Volodin. These are the key points I wanted to make today when presenting the Monetary Policy Guidelines to you. Thank you for your attention.

Presentation

Preview photo: State Duma’s press service