Elvira Nabiullina’s speech at joint meeting of State Duma committees on Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2027–2029
Good afternoon, dear colleagues.
The working group has already discussed the Bank of Russia’s Monetary Policy Guidelines in detail. Therefore, today, I would like to begin with the most urgent issues raised by parliamentarians, which Mr Aksakov has just mentioned. Before doing that, I would like to thank parliamentarians for having considered our monetary policy very professionally, substantively, and thoroughly. This is evident from both the written questions you submitted, to which we responded, and the discussions in the course of the working group’s meetings. I believe it is very helpful that representatives of the related government agencies are invited to assess the current situation and macroeconomic policy in general. It is a useful practice because it helps us examine the situation comprehensively and from different perspectives and identify specific measures that individual agencies can implement within their respective mandates. Monetary policy aims to ensure price stability as the basis for sustainable economic growth. Price stability is crucial for sustaining economic growth in the long term.
I would like to start with the main question raised by Mr Aksakov at the first meeting of the working group, that is, the question of how tight monetary policy is and whether it is excessively tight. First, I would like to explain why the key rate is much higher than inflation. Specifically, the key rate is 14% per annum, while underlying inflation, which excludes one-off and transient factors mentioned by Mr Aksakov, is now assessed at 5–6%. The gap of 8–9 pp is significant. Parliamentarians emphasised that, in other countries, this gap is 1, 2, or 3 pp, asking whether this means that our monetary policy is excessively tight.
This really is a fundamental point. To put it simply, this gap of 8–9 pp reflects two factors currently present in the domestic economy but probably absent from the countries you are comparing Russia with.
The first one is the persistence of inflationary pressures. Average annual inflation has been 8.7% since 2022, which is a rather high rate. The fact that inflation has remained above the target for several years already has led to inflation expectations among people and businesses becoming entrenched at elevated levels. In turn, elevated inflation expectations require a tighter monetary policy stance. Why? As long as households expect prices to rise at a double-digit pace, which is the case now, interest rates, whether deposit rates or bond yields, will also be at double-digit levels. When households expect a double-digit inflation rate, they look at deposit rates when deciding whether to keep their savings with banks. Deposit rates cannot be lower than inflation expectations because no one wants to save or lend for an extended period at an interest rate that would not compensate for future inflation.
The second factor, which sets Russia apart, is a large share of subsidised loans. Other countries with which the domestic economy is often compared either have no subsidised loans, or their share is much smaller. The larger the share of subsidised lending, the higher the cost of credit for everyone else. Why? As you know, inflation reflects the balance between demand and supply. The Central Bank influences demand through credit. Another major driver of demand is budget spending, the budget deficit. The more money the economy receives through the fiscal channel, the smaller the inflow through the credit channel should be. Otherwise, this will lead to high inflation, a sharp rise in prices for both consumer products and investment goods, which businesses seek to purchase using subsidised loans, among other sources of funding. If a large share of credit is extended through subsidised programmes, the market-based share should be limited through high interest rates. Credit needs to be adjusted in line with fiscal spending, that is, the scope of priority tasks addressed by the Government. We take this into account when determining our interest rate policy.
Nevertheless, we have reduced the key rate substantially since June 2025, specifically from 21% to 14% per annum. This is because demand, which had far outpaced supply, gradually came back into balance as supply continued to grow. According to the Bank of Russia’s assessment, demand and supply were broadly balanced by the end of spring 2026. Underlying inflation, that is, the rate excluding one-off factors, VAT, etc., which we have discussed, was only slightly above 4%. Consequently, the gap between the key rate and inflation narrowed as well.
However, we did not even consider cutting the key rate in September or October. We only discussed keeping it on hold. Why? There are three main reasons for this.
The first one is that inflation dynamics changed over the summer. The attacks on Russian refineries, other industrial facilities, data processing and storage centres, and logistics centres have reduced production capacity. We believe this to be temporary because both businesses and the Government have been making every effort to restore the damaged facilities. While the restoration is still under way, demand should grow at a moderate pace. This does not imply a contraction in GDP. However, an excessive increase in demand under current conditions may fuel inflation. We must avoid this. As the facilities are restored and labour productivity gradually improves, this risk will diminish, thereby allowing further monetary policy easing and key rate cuts. But not before then.
The second reason is inflation expectations, which also declined in 2026 H1 but subsequently rose due to objective factors.
Finally, the pause in the key rate reduction cycle is explained by a larger contribution of the budget to demand both this year and in the next two years than we initially expected. Nevertheless, I would like to stress that we are in close contact with the Government regarding this issue. We certainly communicate on monetary and fiscal policy issues, exchanging relevant information. We need to be in close contact to ensure that our policies are mutually predictable.
Each of the above three reasons is critical. Combined, they provide a clear signal that we should not rush to reduce the key rate. This would have the opposite effect, that is, higher interest rates in the economy, faster price growth, and new challenges for Russian enterprises. They already face considerable difficulties. Starting from scratch would be more than undesirable – it would be an unforgivable mistake.
I would now speak on another urgent issue, which relates to concerns about the so-called overcooling in the economy. In the course of our earlier meetings this spring and last autumn, parliamentarians emphasised that the key was not just to decelerate inflation but to avoid compromising the economy’s capacity to expand its potential. I fully agree with this, especially since economists are well aware of the negative implications of prolonged weak demand. Therefore, the Bank of Russia, just like any central bank, thoroughly assesses how its decisions affect the real economy in order to avoid such a situation. A rise in unemployment, a decline in household real incomes, and a decrease in inflation below the target would indicate overcooling. At present, we see no signs of overcooling in the economy.
What can we say about the current situation? Since mid-2026, we have seen increasingly more signs of moderate growth resuming in the economy. Economic growth is supported by bank financing, among other things. Banks are resilient and have sufficient capital cushions. Over the past 12 months, banks expanded their financing to companies by ₽13 trillion through credit and bonds. This is not a record-high amount, but it is still large.
Interest rates remain high, but they were not prohibitive last year and are even less so today. Companies across various industries raise loans to finance both current operations and future development. Given corporate profits and higher demand, these borrowings are reasonable. Profits in the real sector remained at around ₽25 trillion over the past 12 months. Supported by credit, profits, and budget spending, investment stayed at a high level, totalling ₽43 trillion from July 2025 through June 2026. This is the amount invested in the economy.
Parliamentarians often remind us, quite reasonably, that we need not only to see the overall picture but also to look at the details, taking into account the dynamics in specific industries and regions. The situation varies greatly, as we have already discussed with you. There are industries which are developing and increasing employment, investment, and profits. For example, the situation is quite good in non-ferrous metallurgy and a number of machine building subsectors. However, there are also industries facing a downturn, including forestry and wood processing, coal mining, and ferrous metallurgy, which is a widely known fact.
To a certain extent, this heterogeneity is attributed to an unfavourable external environment for some exporters and foreign sanctions, but it is also largely associated with structural shifts in the economy. On the one hand, there are industries experiencing staff shortages. On the other hand, industries facing lower profitability and deteriorating market conditions are struggling to remain competitive in the labour market amid the overall deficit of labour resources. We have already discussed this with you many times. Staff shortages have eased somewhat, according to surveys, but they will nonetheless persist in the foreseeable future. There are industries facing a decline in economic returns for various reasons, and if they decide to retain employees, this would cause significant frictions in the structural transformation. Among other things, such a decision would hamper an increase in labour productivity.
Indeed, we need to take into account staff shortages, since this is an objective physical constraint on output growth. We can see this from both statistics and monthly surveys of businesses.
Of course, there are also staff reductions. I think that you all know such examples in your respective regions. Staff reductions are always painful, but it is worth noting that unemployment in the country is not rising, which means that people are finding jobs elsewhere. If there are jobs in demand in the economy, though not necessarily in the same industry or region, it would be much better both for the economy and these workers’ income if they moved to enterprises where output is expanding, rather than remained at companies unable to ensure stable profits and decent wages. This is something I have already discussed, but I believe it critical to reiterate that a flexible labour market with greater labour mobility is an integral part of the structural transformation and an essential condition for labour productivity growth.
Higher labour productivity appears to be the only way to expand output given the tightness in the labour market. This is apparently a topic for a separate substantive discussion. The Government’s role, particularly in calibrating government support measures, is much greater here than that of any instrument available to the Central Bank. Nevertheless, I would like to say a few words about this as well, since increasing labour productivity would unlock enormous opportunities for economic growth. I would like to emphasise that these figures are very important, in my opinion. Investment in 2026 H1 was almost a quarter higher than five years ago in real terms and nearly doubled in nominal terms. By contrast, labour productivity improved by as little as 5%. What does this mean? This means that productivity growth depends not only and not so much on the amount of investment. Productivity is not just about the number of machines, the extent of robotisation, the number of trucks, or millions of cubic metres of concrete.
What else do we need? Firstly, production resources should be distributed in the economy more efficiently to be concentrated in the areas which are either top priorities or create the highest value added. When the economy faces a deficit of physical and labour resources, this is apparently not the right time to insist on the implementation of projects where returns are only ensured through cheap financing. This is obviously not the most prudent way to use the available investment opportunities. The second area, which is closely related to the above, is the proper organisation of production processes at a specific enterprise. This would significantly enhance productivity even without capital expenditures. We have seen this as well when visiting such companies that have improved their labour productivity without large investment, just by arranging their production processes efficiently.
What are the findings of economic studies? For productivity growth to be more than a slogan, budget investment and government support measures should at least take labour productivity into account. It is highly questionable whether it is worth supporting inefficient enterprises for the sake of preserving jobs, if their products are loss-making. In addition to budget spending, such aid decreases rather than improves productivity and economic efficiency.
Why am I talking of productivity? This is because this topic is directly related to monetary policy. Our monetary policy affects demand. For the gap between demand and supply to close faster and for the Bank of Russia to cut the key rate more quickly, the supply of goods and services should expand more swiftly. Given record-low unemployment (I would like to reiterate that 2.2% is a very low rate according to both Russian and foreign historical levels), higher labour productivity is the only factor that can boost GDP. Judging by the ratio between investment and productivity, it is not just about money. Another proof is the dynamics of credit, which increased by ₽45 trillion, or 88%, over 2022–2025. It is not about money, but rather about motivation and incentives to invest efficiently.
I would now elaborate on investment in general because parliamentarians raised this question and Mr Aksakov has just asked about the investment phase and how the Bank of Russia could contribute to restarting the investment cycle. I would like to emphasise that the task of restarting the investment cycle does not mean that investment has stopped. As I have already said, over the past 12 months, from July 2025 through June 2026, investment totalled ₽43 trillion, which is the most recent figure that we have. What matters is boosting investment further in 2027 and beyond, including both nominal and physical investment. It is best if investment ensures higher labour productivity, which is crucial.
Affordable investment loans are only part of the solution. This is certainly an important part. When can loans, especially long-term ones, become affordable, and the more so, not only for a limited number of companies eligible for subsidised lending, but for any business? They can become affordable only when inflation is low. If inflation is high and concerns about persistently elevated inflation in the future are mounting, moderate interest rates are impossible. Why? Loan rates in the countries cited as an example are moderate not because their policy rates are low, but because it has been many decades since they reined in inflation after a very painful experience of high inflation in the 1970s and, in some countries, also in the 1980s and even the 1990s. They have been keeping it under control for many years, carefully maintaining price stability. It would be incredible to even imagine any discussion about possible inflation of 5%, 6%, or 7% in these countries with low interest rates, including because citizens, voters are very sensitive even about inflation of 3–4%, as we can see. The period of tight monetary policy, which we are currently going through, is a necessary stage on the way towards low inflation and moderate interest rates. In this regard, our country is not unique.
We need to go all the way. This is critical today when we can no longer rely on foreign financing at moderate interest rates from countries with low inflation. Conditions in Russia need to be similar to those that these countries achieved long ago.
What is another reason why low inflation is essential for investment? Companies are consumers of goods and services alike. According to our surveys, our monitoring of businesses covering thousands of companies, it is higher costs that they refer to as the main problem in their current operations. They do complain about high interest rates, but their main problem is not high interest rates, taxes, or weak demand, but rising costs since everything, from components and raw materials to labour and logistics, becomes more expensive. When the growth of costs is high, or even worse, accelerates, it is difficult for businesses to plan any expansion of production. Hence, by decelerating inflation, we are alleviating the burden on companies, helping them plan their future development with greater confidence.
Returning to the issue of investment, the harmful effects of inflation are also evident from investment. In nominal terms, the amount of ₽43 trillion is even higher than a year earlier, whereas real investment decreased by nearly 10%. This means that investment goods have become much more expensive. Among other things, this is due to inflation, and not only more complicated logistics, tighter sanctions, etc.
I am not going to dwell on the importance of low inflation for households. You are well aware of this as you communicate with people extensively and deal with their complaints. I can only stress that high inflation is the most unfair of all taxes as it hurts the most vulnerable groups of the population.
Therefore, we are determined to decelerate inflation and end the period of high price growth. The Government’s plan to gradually reduce the budget deficit will also help address this task. Nevertheless, even assuming that the budget will not hinder disinflation, all other circumstances indicate that the expansion of credit should remain moderate next year, although it will still grow, at roughly this year’s pace. This is why our baseline scenario in the Monetary Policy Guidelines assumes a lower, but still a double-digit key rate throughout 2027.
We have also developed three alternative scenarios, as we did last year. Each of them demonstrates how the Bank of Russia would act under different circumstances. Since uncertainty is high, the situation may differ from the baseline. The alternative scenarios show how the Bank of Russia would act in this case. The most favourable disinflationary scenario assumes that the economy will be able to raise productivity quickly, returns on investment will be higher, and economic resources will be allocated and used more efficiently. This is a challenging, yet quite manageable task, in my opinion. In this scenario, inflation decelerates more quickly, and the key rate will be cut below 10% as early as 2027.
By contrast, we would prefer to avoid the risk and proinflationary scenarios. These two scenarios demonstrate how the Bank of Russia would act if various inflation risks materialised in combination. The main point that these scenarios seek to make is that, regardless of how the situation unfolds, the Bank of Russia will remain committed to ensuring price stability, which is our statutory mandate, while returning the economy’s growth rate to its potential and promoting conditions for sustainable economic growth. Whatever the scenario, we must protect macroeconomic stability, while working closely with the Government. There is no alternative, frankly. The sooner we complete this path, the sooner we will be able to reap all the benefits of restored price stability. Otherwise, in one, two, or even three years, both households and businesses will still be suffering from high inflation and elevated market rates.
I would like to end my speech. Thank you all for your attention. If you have any questions, my colleagues and I – my deputies and directors of key departments are also here – would be glad to answer them.
Thank you very much.