## Assessment for the Uncollateralized Consumer Loans in Russia -Discussion

Identification and measurement of macroprudential policies effect, NES and Bank of Russia workshop June 3, 2021

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#### Introduction I

- Recent working paper by Irina Kozlovtceva, Henry Penikas, Ekaterina Petreneva, Yulia Ushakova (Nov 2020)
- Aim is to estimate the effect of macroprudential measures on consumer lending in Russia
- Research question is relevant because consumer lending constitutes
  10% of banks assets ans has been rising in the past years
- Authors use a comprehensive panel data set (615 banks, 2015-2019)
- Authors carefully construct indices on the macroprudential measures (announcemnet vs application, sensitivity, in period when 60 changes have been introduced to the banking system in Russia)

#### Introduction II

- In the absence of counterfactuals, a good identification strategy is needed to estimate causal effects.
- Authors apply different econometeric methods (BIS approach, dynamic factor models, difference-in-differences)
- Preliminary findings
  - BIS: banks reduce credit growth in the short run, but increase it in the long run (hard to find statistical significant effects)
  - DiD: negative effects on lending growth rates
- Focus today: which specification fits best for Russia?

#### Macroprudential measures

- Aim is to limit growth in uncollateralised consumer lending
- Mark-ups on risk-weights have been stepwise increased
  - Five increases between 2015Q1-2019Q4
  - Time span between announcement and implementation
- How are the quarters in between modelled? Should they take the value of zero?
- Should the rw add-ons add on when measuring intensity?
- Time span between dates different



### BIS approach: Gambarcota and Murcia in (JFMI)

- Aim is to summarise experience of different countries using a meta-analysis approach
- Standardise approach using the same methodology and the same data
- Main equation is  $\Delta Log \ Credit_{bft} = {}^{I}\delta_{f} + \sum_{j=1}^{4} \beta_{j} \Delta Macropru_{t-j}$   $+ \sum_{j=1}^{4} \beta_{j}' \Delta Macropru_{t-j} * \tilde{X}_{bt-j}$   $+ \ controls_{bft} + quarter_{t} + \varepsilon_{bft}$
- Inclusion of interaction to find out whether responses to macropru depends on type of bank (capital cushions, size, liquidity)
- Test is on overall significance of  $\beta$  and  $\beta'$

### RIS annroach

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
• •	VARIABLES	FE without Int	FE with Int	GMM without Int	GMM with Int
		1 11 1111040 1110			
	$\Sigma_{i}^{3} \circ \beta_{i} \Delta M a P_{t-i}$	2.414	-12.73	-1.688	5.258
	$MaP_t$	-0.8259	-4.3813	-2.1655	-28.0192
	$MaP_{t-1}$	-1.7832	-8.4057	-2.7715	16.0796
	$MaP_{t-2}$	1.6695	1.0971	0.7967	24.9208
	$MaP_{t-3}$	$3.3538^{***}$	-1.0415	$2.4525^{**}$	-7.7231
Should not be			1 1		
zoro offer	$\Sigma_{j=0}^{3} \delta_{j} Ma P_{t-j} SIZE_{t-1}$		1.171		-2.414
Zero alter	$\Sigma_{j=0}^{3} \delta_{j} Ma P_{t-j} LIQ_{t-1}$		0.0610		-0.786
201701	$\sum_{j=0}^{3} \delta_j Ma P_{t-j} CAP_{t-1}$		-0.0149		-0.0215
2017 Q1	$\sum_{j=0}^{3} \delta_j Ma P_{t-j} DEP_{t-1}$		0.0164		0.680
	$\sum_{j=0}^{3} \delta_j MaP_{t-j} CtA_{t-1}$		-0.111		0.241
	$SIZE_{t-1}$	-1.4526	-1.9004	10.0339**	15.7699***
	$LIQ_{t-1}$	-0.0075	-0.0166	0.0174	$0.3947^{**}$
	$CAP_{t-1}$	-0.0139	-0.0112	-0.0435	-0.0413
Dohank	$DEP_{t-1}$	0.0479	0.0369	-0.1461	-0.7135**
DO DATIK	$CtA_{t-1}$	-0.6921***	-0.6866***	-0.1150	0.2339
characteristics	$Oil\_growth_{t-1}$	0.0126	0.0120	0.0200	0.0339**
	$\Delta key_rate_{t-1}$	-0.8571***	-0.8458***	-0.8114***	-0.6936**
substantially change	$GDP\_growth_{t-1}$	0.2099	0.2360	0.2808	0.0267
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	$\Delta REER_{t-1}$	0.0033	-0.0029	0.0934	0.0515
every quarter?	QI	-3.9232***	-3.8011***	-5.5412***	-5.4927***
	Q2 Q2	-5.5405	-3.3720	-3.9332	-3.1330
	Q3 V	1.0010	1.0900	0.0170	0.0720
	Constant	17,1075	22,8948	-101.9451***	-147.8330***
	Constant	111010	22.0010	101.0401	111.0000
	Observations	8024	8024	8011	8011
	Groups	649	649	648	648
	$R_{\text{overall}}^2$	0.000438	0.000422		
	$R_{\text{between}}^2$	0.0186	0.0214		
	$R_{\rm within}^2$	0.0234	0.0259	-	_
	Sargan p-value			0	0
	Hansen p-value			0.198	0.151
	N of instrument			55	205
	AR(1)			0.844	1.35e-07
	AR(2)			0.844	0.393

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

#### BIS approach: 46 specifications in 11 tables

- Authors use various econometric specifications and are transparent about results.
- Authors find often insignificant effects on consumer loan growth.
- One explanation could be that BIS approach is not the best fit for the research setting. (One size does not fit all.)
- Questions to consider:
  - How to model the treatment timing?
  - Which banks are more affected than others? E.g. specialised in consumer loans and few capital buffers
  - => leads to a DiD framework

#### DiD –results

#### **Total lending growth rate** for the mpru *announcement date*, deciles in columns by the share of consumer lending in total assets, consider mpru intensity

Variable	OLS2_1	OLS2_2	OLS2_3	OLS2_4	OLS2_5	OLS2_6	OLS2_7	OLS2_8	OLS2_9
D_time	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.011**	0.016***	0.019***	0.028**	0.009	-0.001
D_treat	2.784***	2.496***	2.244***	2.011***	2.421***	2.812***	4.704***	6.052***	(omitted)
D_TT	-0.024***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.026***	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.037***	-0.013	(omitted)
SIZE_L1	0.511***	0.538***	0.537***	0.537***	0.550***	0.569***	0.626***	0.649***	0.501***
LIQ_L1	-0.038*	-0.037	-0.036	-0.038*	-0.036	-0.036	-0.033	-0.03	-0.045**
DEP_L1	0.056**	0.054**	0.052**	0.052**	0.051**	0.049**	0.041*	0.031	0.056**
CAP_L1	0	0.001	0.001	0	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.001	0
key_rate_L1	0.379**	0.387**	0.385**	0.379**	0.384**	0.381**	0.379**	0.370**	0.372**
GDP_L1	41.131**	41.428**	42.355**	42.464**	42.996**	42.376**	41.504**	41.203**	40.278**
REER_L1	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
oil_gr_L1	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
IRB	2.185*	1.682	0.767	1.167	1.134	1.096	0.807	1.004	1.943*
Q1	-3.171***	-3.191***	-3.178***	-3.160***	-3.162***	-3.171***	-3.177***	-3.199***	-3.184***
Q2	-4.543***	-4.549***	-4.553***	-4.543***	-4.543***	-4.552***	-4.579***	-4.574***	-4.542***
Q3	-1.173*	-1.192*	-1.195*	-1.182*	-1.196*	-1.185*	-1.192*	-1.164*	-1.154
cons	-11.081***	-11.570***	-11.703***	-11.790***	-12.418***	-13.062***	-15.236***	-16.686***	-10.412***
Ν	13235	13235	13235	13235	13235	13235	13235	13235	13235
r2	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.018	0.02	0.02	0.016
r2_a	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.019	0.019	0.015

D\_time: Not sure about resampling time periods

D\_treat: whether in a certain decile of consumer loan/ capital cushion distribution

D\_tt: quite homogenous

No need to include lags of banking characteristics

not sure about quarter dummies

# Exploit heterogeneity among banks and timing/intensity of measures

- Define treated banks as having high CtA, low CB buffer or preferable both
- Compare their average outcomes to banks in the control group
- Pull out marginal effects over time



Table 4 Marginal effects of LTV treatment group (continuous) ov

	(4)	(2)	(2)	(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	LIV_over_90	LIV_80_90	LIV_66_80	_IV_under_6
20113#LTV	-0.05	0.51	-0.17	-0.29
	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.33)	(0.22)
20114#LTV	-0.31	0.43	0.15	0.15
	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.48)	(0.35)
20121#LTV	-0.20	0.42	-0.59	0.37
	(0.22)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.29)
20122#LTV	-0.50**	-0.11	0.55*	0.05
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.29)
20123#LTV	-0.82***	0.34	-0.01	0.49*
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.42)	(0.24)
20124#LTV	-1.04***	0.19	-0.02	0.86*
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.45)	(0.48)
20131#LTV	-0.95***	0.11	0.25	0.59
	(0.20)	(0.38)	(0.56)	(0.37)
20132#LTV	-0.76***	0.23	0.33	0.21
	(0.16)	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.42)
20133#LTV	-0.84***	-0.31	0.70	0.46
	(0.17)	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.41)
20134#LTV	-1.07***	-0.00	0.44	0.64*
	(0.25)	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.32)
2013q1#CCyB	-0.36***	-1.72***	2.11***	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.35)
Observations	275	275	275	275
R-squared	0.60	0.62	0.52	0.75

#### Conclusion

-A lot of data work, a good overview on macropru measures

- -Relevant research question
- -Encourage authors to deviate from BIS approach
- Next steps: try a different definition of treatment in DiD and estimate marginal effects over time

## Thank you for your attention!

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