MONETARY CONDITIONS AND MONETARY TRANSMISSION

INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY

Average RUONIA value — January

15.76%

▼ -26 bp

Government bond yields (RGBI) — January

14.58%

▲ +21 bp on December average

Corporate bond yields (IFX-Cbonds) — January

15.81%

▼ -40 bp on December average

Interest rate on long-term loans to non-financial organisations — December (preliminary)

13.8%

▼ -0.3 pp on November

Interest rate on short-term household deposits — December

15.5%

▲ +0.1 pp on November

Money supply (M2X) — January (preliminary)

11.3% YoY AFCR

▼ 12.0% YoY AFCR in December

Sources: Bank of Russia, Moscow Exchange.

- **Monetary indicators mainly remained tight in December–January.**
- **In January, RUONIA was close to the key rate** under the impact of increased competition among banks in the money market for short-term liquidity.
- **Average monthly nominal yields in some financial market segments went up in January.** Given rising inflation expectations, real rates remained at the level of previous months.
- **Price conditions for loans and deposits were changing diversely in December.** The continued key rate decline in December, on the one hand, translated into the dynamics of long-term corporate loan rates. On the other hand, expectations of a more significant easing of monetary policy at the December meeting were evident in an upward adjustment in deposit rates following financial market yields.
- **In December–January, growth in monetary aggregates was mainly decelerating.** This was caused by more moderate dynamics of fiscal operations and claims on the economy. Concurrently, the slowdown in corporate lending growth was accompanied by an acceleration in retail lending.

MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION

The monetary policy transmission mechanism (or monetary policy transmission) is a sequence of links in the economy through which monetary policy influences demand and, accordingly, inflation.

This mechanism is based on interest rates and yields in the key market segments, influencing each other. The key rate has a direct effect on short-term money market rates. Expectations of further changes in short-term rates, together with demand for loans and supply of savings, impact long-term rates and yields on federal government bonds (OFZ).

Rates, in turn, influence the propensity to save, consume, and invest (the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism), the ability of borrowers to provide high-quality collateral and that of banks – to expand lending (the credit and balance sheet channels), as well as the wealth of investors (the welfare channel), and the ruble exchange rate (the foreign exchange channel).

Through any of these channels, higher market rates constrain demand and inflation, while lower ones stimulate them. In addition to monetary policy and demand, inflation and financial market trends are influenced by many other factors that are taken into account by the Bank of Russia when deciding on the key rate.

This material briefly describes monetary policy transmission and the conditions of its functioning.

INDIVIDUAL INDICATORS OF MONETARY POLICY TIGHTNESS AND THEIR CHANGES **Chart 1**

Note. The indicator panel represents one possible summary visualisation of key indicators to help assess monetary conditions and their changes. It should not be considered a comprehensive presentation of all types of indicators relevant to assessing the nature of and changes in monetary conditions. The chart shows the level of the indicator (z-score) relative to the distribution of values from January 2017 to December 2025 (left-hand chart) and to January 2026 (right-hand chart). The round marker denotes an indicator's level (in standard deviations) as of the previous date. A shift of the indicator to the left relative to the previous date indicates an easing of monetary conditions, a shift to the right – their tightening. The z-scores for high-frequency indicators (OFZ yields, money market rates, the exchange rate, the spread between CORP and OFZ yields, etc.) were calculated based on the averages for the relevant month. The z-score for the spread between RUONIA and the key rate was taken out of the calculation of the overall average indicator due to high volatility.

* The indicators were used to calculate the inverse z-score.

** The average for the issues maturing in 2028, 2030, and 2032. The distribution of values since October 2021.

Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

HISTORICAL DYNAMICS OF INDIVIDUAL INDICATORS OF MONETARY TIGHTNESS **Chart 2**



* The indicators were used to calculate the inverse z-score.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

MONEY MARKET AND KEY RATE

- **Monetary policy and key rate.** On 13 February 2026, the Bank of Russia Board of Directors decided to cut the key rate by 50 bp to 15.50% per annum. The economy continued to return to a balanced growth path. Concurrently, price growth accelerated significantly due to one-off factors in January. However, the Bank of Russia estimates that the underlying measures of current price growth have not changed considerably.

  The Bank of Russia stated that it would assess the advisability of lowering the key rate at its next meetings depending on the sustainability of the inflation slowdown and the dynamics of inflation expectations. In the baseline scenario, this assumes an average key rate in the range of 13.5–14.5% per annum in 2026.

  The decision was generally in line with market expectations, although some analysts had assumed the key rate to remain unchanged at the February meeting.

- **Banking sector liquidity and overnight rates (RUONIA).** RUONIA averaged 15.76% in January 2026 (vs 16.02% in December 2025). The spread between RUONIA and the key rate narrowed to -24 bp (vs -32 bp in December). The spread volatility decreased to 14 bp (vs 25 bp in December).

  At the end of December, most money market participants maintained correspondent accounts above the level required to average required reserves (RR), as they wished to create spare funds for settlements during the New Year holidays. This was done both on account of market sources and the Bank of Russia's standing facilities. In these conditions, at the end of the December RR averaging period (AP),[1] banks had already largely completed the RR averaging. They therefore decreased demand for liquidity, which put downward pressure on interest rates.

  At the beginning of the January AP,[2] demand for liquidity recovered and the spread narrowed. In late January, during the tax payment period, some banks temporarily increased their demand for liquidity. They increased their demand at the Bank of Russia's one-week repo auctions, driving out other auction participants who usually offered higher rates in the money market. This put upward pressure on RUONIA that was close to the key rate in late January.

[1] From 10 December 2025 until 13 January 2026.

[2] From 14 January until 10 February 2026.

VOLUME AND COST OF OVERNIGHT BORROWING (AVERAGE VALUE FOR AP) **Chart 3**



* The cost of borrowing from legal entities, adjusted for RRs. The sample only includes certain transactions of large legal entities where the parameters of a transaction are specified in the payment details.
** The weighted average cost of overnight borrowing in the money market, taking into account the Bank of Russia's standing facilities.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

BANK OF RUSSIA OPERATIONS AND BANKING SECTOR LIQUIDITY BALANCE (AVERAGE VALUE FOR AP) (₽ TN) **Chart 4**



* The structural liquidity surplus/deficit of the banking sector minus the operations, demand for which is non-market in nature. The indicator shows whether market participants need to raise liquidity from the Bank of Russia.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

The banking sector's demand for liquidity on market terms remained virtually unchanged in January, averaging ₽3.1 trillion (vs ₽3.2 trillion in December). The inflow of funds into banks was mainly caused by the seasonal decrease in the amount of cash in circulation, amounting to ₽0.4 trillion (vs the outflow of ₽0.8 trillion in December), which was close to the average values of previous years. In addition, there was a small liquidity inflow as the Federal Treasury (FT) was actively depositing funds with banks and under repo agreements. However, compared to previous years, this inflow was smaller because the FT deposited a significant amount of temporarily available budget funds with banks back in December.[3]

- **The average structural liquidity deficit forecast** over the December 2025 AP is estimated to range from ₽1.9 trillion to ₽3.0 trillion, while the banks' demand for liquidity on market terms is estimated to range from ₽5.3 trillion to ₽6.4 trillion. Liquidity outflows from banks will be mainly driven by an increased amount of cash in circulation. It is also expected that the outflow related

[3] See Monetary Conditions and Monetary Transmission, December 2025.

CHANGE IN CASH IN CIRCULATION (CUMULATIVE, YEAR-TO-DATE)
(₽ TN) **Chart 5**



Note. '+' – decrease; '-' – increase.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

to the mirroring of National Wealth Fund (NWF) investments for 2025 H2 will exceed the inflow generated by the current investment of NWF resources in 2026 H1.[4] This will result in a net outflow of liquidity from banks. The Bank of Russia mirrors all transactions carried out by the Russian Ministry of Finance, involving NWF resources, including investments. In addition, the FT promptly deposits balances in budget accounts with banks, so these transactions are neutral for the banking sector liquidity balance over the long term. An increase in banks' RRs in proportion to the growth in money supply will also result in some increase in demand for liquidity.

- **Money market.** By the end of January, the ROISfix curve continued to shift moderately downwards for all maturities up to two years. Curve movements ranged from -14 bp to +16 bp. The market expects that the key rate cut will continue in 2026, though at a moderate pace.

ROISFIX CURVE **Table 1**

Maturity	1w	2w	1M	2M	3M	6M	1Y	2Y
30.01.2026	15.84	15.85	15.86	15.85	15.79	15.52	14.90	14.32
30.12.2025	15.98	15.95	15.93	15.90	15.85	15.59	15.09	14.16
Change, bp	-14	-10	-7	-5	-6	-7	-19	16
Average for 2025	18.98	18.96	18.88	18.76	18.63	18.39	17.71	16.08
Change, bp	-314	-311	-302	-291	-284	-287	-281	-176

BOND MARKET

- **OFZ yield curve.** In January, average monthly OFZ yields rose along the entire length of the curve. The dynamics of the short-term end of the curve were associated with an upward revision of market expectations for the further key rate path due to more active CPI growth in the first half of January according to weekly data. The increase in yields on long-term securities was caused, among other things, by the growth of inflation expectations among both households and businesses, in particular because of one-off factors, namely higher VAT and excise taxes, indexation of transport and utility tariffs, as well as a high probability that budget risks would materialise.

[4] See Monetary Conditions and Monetary Transmission, November 2025.

- **Breakeven inflation.** In January, breakeven inflation rose across all maturities: OFZ-IN (maturing in 2032) – by 50 bp to 6.1%, and OFZ-IN (maturing in 2028) by 154 bp to 4.2%, remaining close to the inflation target.

OFZ ZERO COUPON YIELD CURVE **Table 2**

Maturity	1Y	2Y	3Y	5Y	7Y	10Y
30.01.2026	14,41	14,77	14,96	14,99	14,77	14,61
30.12.2025	13,14	13,92	14,30	14,58	14,59	14,44
Change, bp	127	85	65	41	26	18
Average for January 2026	13,99	14,51	14,75	14,85	14,76	14,55
Average for December 2025	13,86	14,35	14,56	14,63	14,52	14,26
Change, bp	13	16	19	22	24	29
Average for 2025	15,91	15,48	15,33	15,18	15,06	14,92
Change, bp	-151	-71	-37	-19	-21	-31

- **Secondary OFZ market.** The secondary OFZ market turnover declined month on month. Daily average trades equalled ₽37.0 billion (vs ₽51 billion per day in December). The composition and behaviour of market participants did not change. The primary buyers were non-bank financial institutions using their equity (₽50.3 billion) and individuals (₽34.2 billion). SICIs remained the largest net sellers in January (-₽115.2 billion).

- **OFZ offerings.** In January, the Russian Ministry of Finance held three auction weeks due to long holidays. The Ministry was mainly offering fixed coupon federal government bonds (OFZ-PD) with maturities from three to seven years. In general, low demand and offering volumes were within the seasonal norm. Mainly credit institutions, including SICIs, demonstrated interest in securities. The premium to the OFZ-PD secondary market yields ranged from +5 bp to +11 bp.

  In terms of earnings, the Russian Ministry of Finance's borrowing target for 2026 is set at ₽5.5 trillion with that for 2026 Q1 set at ₽1.2 trillion.

- **Secondary corporate bond market.** In January, average corporate bond yields were below December values (15.81% in January vs 16.21% in December, on average). The average monthly spread between this index and OFZ yields continued to decline, totalling 162 bp (vs 218 bp in December) and reaching the level below the average value for January 2022–November 2025 (200 bp) for the first time.

- **Primary corporate bond market.** In January, in the primary market, the volume of new corporate bonds was significantly lower MoM and YoY (₽230 billion in January 2026; ₽1,236 billion in December 2025; ₽459 billion in January 2025). But in general, the dynamics were consistent with the first months of previous years.

  In January 2026, the corporate bond portfolio shrank MoM, while the YtD growth was comparable to February 2025 (vs -0.4% in January 2026, +3.4% in December 2025, -0.6% in February 2025). The total corporate bond market amount decreased to ₽35.4 trillion at the end of January (+13.4% YoY; ₽35.5 trillion in December 2025). In January, the main large issuers were certain development institutions as well as oil and gas companies.

- **Quasi-foreign currency corporate bonds.** Foreign currency-denominated bonds were not offered in January. Due to their redemption, the total portfolio in ruble equivalent shrank by ₽80 billion (vs ₽179 billion in December 2025). According to Cbonds, yields on substitute bonds rose to 7.77% as of the end of the month (+27 bp MoM; -244 bp YoY).

LOAN AND DEPOSIT RATES

- **Corporate loan rates.** According to preliminary estimates, in December, long-term[5] rates continued to decrease in the corporate lending segment, and short-term rates also resumed their decline (Chart 12). Eventually, by the end of the year, interest rates on loans to corporate borrowers were considerably lower than the average for 2025 Q3. This was largely due to the already implemented and expected monetary policy easing, but it was also partly because of the change in the structure of market turnover and fluctuations in the volume of transactions on quasi-preferential terms.[6]

- **Retail loan rates.** In December, rates on market mortgages remained close to the level of previous months. Concurrently, there was still no clear downward trend in rates in the long-term non-mortgage lending segment. According to estimates, in December, their cost remained close to the level of mid-2025. However, growing activity in the subsidised mortgage lending segment in anticipation of tighter lending terms under the Family Mortgage programme from 1 February 2026 led to a decrease in the average market long-term rate by significant 1.9 pp to 14.4% p.a. (Chart 12). The short-term lending rate equalled 27.1% p.a., remaining virtually unchanged. According to recent data, in January, major banks resumed cutting rates on market-based mortgages after a pause in October–December 2025 (Chart 13).

- **Deposit rates.** Deposit rates stopped to decline in December. Rates on short-term deposits rose by 0.1 pp to 15.5% p.a., and those on long-term ones went up by 0.7 pp to 12.2% p.a., thereby completely offsetting the November decline (Chart 12). The main reason for this was the more moderate monetary policy easing compared to the expectations of some market participants and the subsequent increase in yields in the financial market. According to recent data, a number of large banks adjusted interest rates offered on their products downwards in January. The FRG100[7] index calculated for one-year deposits declined by 0.2 pp to 11.4% as of the end of January (Chart 13).

CREDIT AND DEPOSIT AGGREGATES

- **Bank lending conditions.** The survey results[8] indicate that the easing of bank lending conditions (BLC) in 2025 Q4 largely affected the retail segment of the market, while BLC for corporate borrowers in October–December barely changed (Chart 14). As in the previous phase of the survey, the main factors behind the BLC easing in the retail segment were the key rate cut and competition for reliable borrowers, while in the corporate segment, the BLC easing was primarily contained by banks' concerns about companies' financial standing.

  As in previous quarters, in 2025 Q4, respondent banks mainly eased their price BLC. In turn, non-price BLC remained virtually unchanged for all categories of borrowers in 2025 Q4. Only in the segment of lending to large enterprises, the surveyed banks noted a slight tightening of non-price BLC due to increased requirements for borrowers' financial standing and a reduction in the maturity of loans provided.

[5] Interest rates on short-term deposits (for up to one year, except for sight deposits), short-term loans (for up to one year), and long-term deposits and loans (for over one year).

[6] Quasi-preferential terms mean alternative measures to support borrowers, other than subsidised loan rates. They include government guarantees, subsidised funding for banks, and granting loans at reduced rates with the involvement of government development institutions, the NWF, and other government agencies. For details, see Box 11 'Subsidised lending and its impact on the transmission mechanism' of the Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2026–2028.

[7] The average interest rate of the 80 largest deposit banks on one-year deposits worth at least ₽100,000, according to the information agency Frank RG.

[8] The Bank of Russia's quarterly survey of changes in bank lending conditions for large banks.

In 2025 Q4, demand for borrowed funds increased but was weaker than expected by respondent banks based on the results of 2025 Q3. The growth in demand for loans was more evident in retail, which, among other things, the surveyed banks explained as households' desire to purchase cars on credit before an increase in the recycling fee at the end of 2025 or housing before the Family Mortgage programme terms tightening in February 2026. Concurrently, respondent banks continued to note the growing need of corporate borrowers to restructure existing loans, especially among small and medium-sized businesses.

In 2026 H1, large banks expect further BLC easing, more significantly for retail borrowers. In addition, in their opinion, the main direction of BLC easing will be the reduction in interest rates, which will be supported by the ongoing monetary policy easing. Market participants also revised their expectations for the dynamics of demand for loans in 2026 Q1 downwards. While in 2025 Q3, they said that the monetary policy easing anticipated in the short run would support demand for loans in the first months of the year. Afterwards, based on the results of 2025 Q4, they reported that demand would decline due to traditional intra-year seasonality in January–March 2026. In turn, according to the respondent banks, the recovery in demand for new loans will primarily affect the consumer lending segment in 2026 Q2.

- **Banking system's claims on organisations.** In December,[9] the dynamics of claims on organisations[10] were largely influenced by one-off fluctuations associated with the specific structure of individual transactions. As of the end of the month, claims on organisations decreased by 0.7%, however, excluding one-off effects, their dynamics remained positive, although weaker than in October–November. Mainly long-term ruble loans issued to non-financial companies, as well as bank investments in their ruble bonds grew in December. Contrastingly, financial institutions more actively repaid previously accumulated liabilities at the end of the calendar year. As of the end of 2025, the increase in claims on organisations equalled 11.8% (Chart 15). According to preliminary data, in January 2026, the reduction in ruble claims on organisations was more noticeable than in similar periods of previous years.
- **Banking system's claims on households.** In December, growth of claims on households remained moderate. Over the month, the claims grew by 0.4% compared to 0.5% in November. Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations, the rate of growth in claims on households was close to the November level, with their annual increase equalling 2.8% (Chart 15). The positive dynamics of claims on households were still supported by activity in the mortgage segment, while non-mortgage lending continued to decline (Chart 16). Under the impact of increased demand for family mortgages before the tightening of their terms from February 2026, the amount of issued mortgage loans exceeded ₽800 billion (above the June 2024 value, which was the last month when the non-targeted subsidised mortgage programme was still in effect), with the proportion of loans on subsidised terms in it exceeding 80%. Concurrently, annual growth in outstanding amounts of housing mortgage loans[11] to households sped up to 9.0%. According to preliminary data, in January 2026, the growth in claims on households, similar to previous months, was driven by high activity in the mortgage segment (in fact, borrowed funds under applications for family mortgages approved in December were probably granted at the beginning of 2026).

[9] See Credit to the Economy and Money Supply (as of 1 January 2026).

[10] Hereinafter, increases in balance sheet indicators are calculated based on the Depository Corporations Survey as of the relevant reporting date. Increases in foreign currency claims and deposits are calculated in US dollar terms. Where increases in the indicators comprising foreign currency and ruble components are calculated herein, the growth rate of the foreign currency component is converted into rubles using the period average exchange rate. See also Main methodological differences between monetary statistics and banking sector's statistics.

[11] As regards the indicator 'Outstanding housing mortgages', in addition to the housing mortgage portfolio, banks also recognise on their balance sheets (according to Reporting Form 0409316) the housing mortgages transferred to mortgage agents under securitisation transactions (according to the estimates based on Reporting Form 0409316 and mortgage agents' accounting statements).

- **Household deposits.** The growth in ruble funds kept by households on deposit amounted to 6.0% in December after a decrease of 0.1% in the previous month. To a large extent, this increase was due to seasonal social payments and bonuses based on the results of the year, as well as the rescheduling of part of the payments from January 2026. However, adjusted for seasonal fluctuations, the growth was weaker than during the same periods of recent years. The annual growth rate of households' ruble deposits also slowed to 16.2% from 18.2% in November (Chart 17). Short-term deposits, the rates on which remained the most attractive for depositors, continued to prevail in the maturity structure of the ruble deposit portfolio. In December, the proportion of such deposits equalled 57%, having decreased only slightly due to the inflow of funds into current accounts. In turn, the proportion of long-term deposits continued to shrink and amounted to 13% by the end of December. Activity in the FX segment of the deposit market slowed. According to the results of December, the growth of funds in it was 0.4% after 2.0% in the previous month. According to recent data, the traditional decrease in households' ruble funds with banks was more sizeable in January compared to 2024–2025.

MONETARY AGGREGATES

- **Money supply.** The annual growth rates of money supply in the national definition (M2) and broad money supply (M2X) continued to decelerate and, by the end of 2025, equalled 10.6% and 12.0% after 12.3% and 13.1% in November, respectively (Chart 18). Moreover, the decline in the annual growth rate of M2 from the peak values of 2022–2024 (from 19.2–24.4% to 10.6%) outpaced the decline in M2X (from 14.0–15.4% to 12.0%). The increases in aggregates at the end of December were seasonally larger but noticeably lower than the historical values for the same period: M2 rose by 3.9% after 1.3% in November, and M2X went up by 3.5% after 1.3% in the previous month. Nevertheless, monthly changes in monetary aggregates, adjusted for the impact of seasonal factors, were lower. According to recent data, in January,[12] the annual growth of monetary aggregates continued to decelerate.

- **Sources of money supply.** The slower annual growth of broad money in December by 1.1 pp to 12.0% was mainly caused by a slowdown in the growth of claims on the economy and more moderate dynamics of budget expenditures at the end of the year. Thus, the contribution of the banking system's claims on the economy to the annual growth of broad money equalled 10.4 pp after 11.9 pp in the previous month. Furthermore, the slowdown in claims on organisations, which occurred, among other things, due to the specifics of the structure of the conducted transactions and the receipt of funds by organisations to pay for government orders, partially offset the acceleration of claims on households owing to mortgage lending. Fiscal operations supported money supply growth in December. But because of more uniform expenditures throughout the year, their growth was more moderate in December compared to previous years. The contribution of net claims on general government to the annual growth of M2X totalled 3.3 pp in December, which was almost 2 pp lower than in the previous month (Chart 19).

- **Components of money supply.** The slower growth of ruble deposits in the real sector, which continued in December, resulted in their smaller contribution to the annual growth of M2X to 8.7 pp after 10.2 pp a month earlier. Foreign currency deposits decreased in December. Yet, because of their continued significant annual growth, they accounted for 2.5 pp of the annual M2X increase in December compared to 2.2 pp in the previous month. Cash in circulation outside the banking system (M0) rose by 4.3% in December after 0.5% in the previous month. However, the share of M0 in M2 remained virtually unchanged over the month, equalling 14.1%, which was close to the level observed throughout the year.

[12] See Monetary Aggregates – Assessment (January 2026).

- **Exchange rate (foreign exchange channel)**

In January, the ruble strengthened against the main foreign currencies, namely by 3.3% against the US dollar, by 1.8% against the euro, and by 2.7% against the yuan. The exchange rate was still supported by tight monetary policy, as well as relatively large sales of foreign currency by exporters, the volume of which increased compared to November–December of 2025. Other factors driving optimism in the FX market include hopes for an improvement in the geopolitical situation due to renewed negotiations, moderate demand for foreign currency from importers, including due to sanctions restrictions and rising duties, and the weakening of the US dollar in global markets due to the US administration' domestic and foreign policy.

RUBLE EXCHANGE RATE **Table 3**

	USD/RUB (Bank of Russia)	EUR/RUB (Bank of Russia)	CNY/RUB (Moscow Exchange)
30.01.2026	75.73	90.47	10.94
30.12.2025	78.23	92.09	11.23
Change, %	+3.30	+1.79	+2.65
Average for January	77.56	91.20	11.09
Average for December	78.44	91.87	11.10
Change, %	+1.13	+0.73	+0.09
Average for 2025	83.62	94.31	11.65
Change, %	-9.44	-4.07	-6.09

Note. '+' – depreciation of the ruble; '-' – appreciation of the ruble.
Sources: Moscow Exchange, Bank of Russia calculations.

The real effective exchange rate (REER) of the ruble, calculated against the currencies of its major trading partners, strengthened by 2.1% in December compared to the previous month. According to preliminary data, the REER strengthened by 5.7% in January compared to December and remained above its median in recent years (+25.1% vs the median from January 2015 to December 2025). USD/RUB demonstrated similar dynamics relative to its median: +14.5%, EUR/RUB: +10.7%, CNY/RUB: +35.5%.

- **Russian stock market**

The Russian stock market was up as of the end of January. During the month, the index was changing diversely, fluctuating between 2,674 p and 2,843 p due to geopolitical factors, statistics on inflation, and a stronger ruble.

As of the end of the month, the MOEX Russia Index equalled 2,783 p (+0.6% MoM), while the Russian Volatility Index (RVI) decreased to 27 p (-8 p MoM). All sectoral indices were mainly up as of the end of the month. Prices for shares of electric power supply, metals, and mining and quarrying companies demonstrated the strongest growth (+8.4% MoM +8.6% MoM, and +8.6% MoM, respectively). The exceptions were the oil and gas sector (-1.5% MoM) and construction companies (-0.2% MoM).

- **Global markets**

The GDP-weighted average policy rate in advanced economies remained approximately at 2.75% in January. Only Israel cut its policy rate (-25 bp to 4%). The weighted average policy rates in emerging market economies decreased this month: Ghana (-250 bp to 15.5%), Turkey (-100 bp to 37%), Uruguay (-100 bp to 6.5%), Paraguay (-25 bp to 5.75%). The exception was Colombia (+100 bp to 10.25%).

As of the end of January, the average monthly yields of US Treasuries rose by 4–8 bp (Table 4), which may be related to the increase in the UST term premium due to geopolitical factors and the imposition of new tariffs for Europe by the United States.

Over January, European bond yields changed insignificantly (by 1–2 bp, on average) for all maturities.

UST YIELD CURVE **Table 4**

Maturity	2Y	5Y	10Y
30.01.2026	3.52	3.79	4.26
31.12.2025	3.47	3.73	4.18
Change, bp	+5	+6	+8
Average for January 2026	3.54	3.78	4.21
Average for December 2025	3.50	3.70	4.14
Change, bp	+4	+8	+7
Average for 2025	3.81	3.92	4.29
Change, bp	-27	-14	-8

Sources: Cbonds, Bank of Russia calculations.

As of the end of January, the US Dollar Index (DXY) declined (-1.3% to 97 p) to its minimum value since 2022 due to the sale of US assets and capital outflows amid geopolitical uncertainty. In January, EMEs' currencies mostly strengthened against the US dollar (BRL/USD: +4.3%; CNY/USD: +0.8%; TRY/USD: -1.3%; MXN/USD: +3.0%).

As of the end of January, global stock markets were mostly up (S&P 500: +1.4%; Stoxx 600: +3.1%; Nikkei 225: +5.9%; SSE Composite: +3.8%; Nifty 50: -2.4%; MSCI ACWI: +8.9%). The European Stoxx 600 index surpassed the 600-point mark for the first time, driven by growth of the financial and technology sectors. Asian markets saw gains, driven by the motor vehicle, semiconductor, and AI sectors, as well as a weaker yen.

STATISTICAL TABLES AND CHARTS

JANUARY SAW INFLOW OF FUNDS AS AMOUNT OF CASH IN CIRCULATION DECREASED AND FT FUNDS WERE ACTIVELY DEPOSITED WITH BANKS

(₽ TN) **Table 5**

	2025	January 2026	2026 (forecast)
Liquidity deficit (+) / surplus (-) (as of beginning of period)	**0.6**	**0.6**	**0.0**
Liquidity inflow (+) / outflow (-):	0.0	0.6	[-2.4; -1.3]
change in balances of funds in general government accounts with the Bank of Russia and other operations*	1.2	0.2	[-0.7; -0.3]
change in cash in circulation	-1.0	0.4	[-1.3; -0.8]
change in required reserves	-0.2	0.0	[-0.4; -0.2]
Structural liquidity deficit (+) / surplus (-) (as of period-end)	**0.6**	**0.0**	**[1.9; 3.0]**
Structural liquidity deficit (-) / surplus (+) (monthly average for AP)**	**0.4**	**0.2**	
Demand for liquidity on market terms (monthly average for AP)**	**3.2**	**3.0**	**[5.3; 6.4]**

* Including fiscal rule-based operations to buy / sell foreign currency in the domestic FX market and other operations.
** Data for the RR AP closest to the period end.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

RUONIA

(%) **Chart 6**



Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

SPREAD BETWEEN RUONIA AND KEY RATE NARROWED IN JANUARY AMID GROWING BANKING SECTOR'S DEMAND FOR LIQUIDITY ON MARKET TERMS

Chart 7

SPREAD BETWEEN RUONIA AND KEY RATE, PP



LIQUIDITY DEFICIT/SURPLUS, ₽ TN



Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

BANK OF RUSSIA'S BALANCE SHEET
(₽ TN) **Chart 8**



* This item is balancing and comprises changes in all other, not differentiated, items of the Bank of Russia's balance sheet.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

IN JANUARY, MONEY MARKET CURVES DECLINED FOR THE SHORT-TERM MATURITIES AND ROSE FOR THE MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM ONES **Chart 9**



Sources: Bank of Russia, National Finance Association.

OFZ CURVE GREW FOR MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM MATURITIES IN NOVEMBER **Chart 10**



Sources: Moscow Exchange, National Finance Association.

SPREAD BETWEEN OFZ AND UST YIELDS REMAINED AT THE SAME LEVEL AS IN THE PREVIOUS MONTH **Chart 11**

SPREAD BETWEEN BANK OF RUSSIA KEY RATE AND US FED FUNDS RATE, PP



SPREAD BETWEEN OFZ AND UST YIELDS, PP



Sources: Moscow Exchange, Cbonds, Bank of Russia calculations.

LENDING RATES CONTINUED TO DECLINE IN DECEMBER **Chart 12**

INTEREST RATES ON BANKS' RUBLE LONG-TERM TRANSACTIONS, % P.A.



Source: Bank of Russia.

IN JANUARY, INTEREST RATES ON MOST RETAIL BANKING PRODUCTS EDGED DOWN **Chart 13**

HIGH-FREQUENCY INTEREST RATE INDICATORS, % P.A.



* Until 1 July 2024 – the interest rate under the Subsidised Mortgage programme, from 1 July 2024 – the interest rate under the Family Mortgage programme.
Sources: Bank of Russia, Frank RG, JSC DOM.RF.

OVERALL EASING OF LENDING CONDITIONS IN 2025 Q4 WAS CONSTRAINED BY PERSISTENTLY TIGHT NON-PRICE CONDITIONS, PARTICULARLY FOR CORPORATE CLIENTS **Chart 14**

INDICES OF LENDING CONDITIONS,* PP



* The dotted lines show respondent banks' expectations (recorded in 2025 Q4) regarding changes in lending conditions and demand for loans in 2026 H1.
Source: Bank of Russia.

IN DECEMBER, DECELERATED GROWTH OF CLAIMS ON ORGANISATIONS WAS FOLLOWED BY ACCELERATED GROWTH OF CLAIMS ON HOUSEHOLDS **Chart 15**

BANKING SYSTEM'S CLAIMS, %

Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

GROWTH IN RETAIL LENDING CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE DUE TO MORTGAGES IN DECEMBER **Chart 16**

CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS TO ANNUAL GROWTH IN BANKING SYSTEM'S CLAIMS ON HOUSEHOLDS, PP



Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF HOUSEHOLD DEPOSITS CONTINUED TO DECLINE IN DECEMBER **Chart 17**

CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS TO ANNUAL GROWTH IN HOUSEHOLD DEPOSITS, PP



Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

CREDIT AND DEPOSIT MARKET INDICATORS **Table 6**

		September 2025	October 2025	November 2025	December 2025
Interest rates on banks' long-term transactions in rubles					
household deposits	% p.a.	13.0	12.1	11.5	12.2
household loans	% p.a.	16.9	16.6	16.3	14.4
corporate loans	% p.a.	16.1	15.3	14.0	13.8
household deposits	**% YoY, AFCR**	**19.3**	**19.4**	**17.8**	**16.1**
in rubles	% YOY	20.9	20.3	18.2	16.2
in foreign currency	% YOY	-2.5	7.1	14.3	16.5
share of foreign currency	%	5.1	5.3	5.2	5.0
Claims of banking system on economy	**% YoY, AFCR**	**9.3**	**9.5**	**10.3**	**9.4**
on organisations	% YoY, AFCR	13.3	13.5	13.7	11.8
on households	% YoY, AFCR	-1.1	-0.8	1.3	2.8
Money supply (M2)	**% YOY**	**12.7**	**13.0**	**12.3**	**10.6**
Broad money (M2X)	**% YoY, AFCR**	**12.2**	**13.1**	**13.1**	**12.0**

Note. YoY – year-on-year, AFCR – adjusted for foreign currency revaluation. The Marshall-Edgeworth decomposition is used to make the adjustment for foreign currency revaluation.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH CONTINUED TO SLOW IN JANUARY **Chart 18**

ANNUAL GROWTH OF MAIN MONETARY AGGREGATES, %



* Adjusted for foreign currency revaluation.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

IN DECEMBER, DECLINE IN ANNUAL BROAD MONEY GROWTH WAS DUE TO SLOWER GROWTH RATE OF CLAIMS ON ECONOMY AND MORE MODERATE BUDGET SPENDING DYNAMICS **Chart 19**

CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS TO ANNUAL M2X GROWTH, PP



* Adjusted for foreign currency revaluation.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

RUBLE CONTINUED TO STRENGTHEN AGAINST OTHER CURRENCIES IN JANUARY
(02.01.2019 = 100) **Chart 20**

RUBLE EXCHANGE RATE AGAINST FOREIGN CURRENCIES



Sources: Cbonds, Bank of Russia calculations.

IN JANUARY, RUBLE'S REAL EXCHANGE RATE WAS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN MEDIAN VALUE OF 2017–2021* **Chart 21**



* The calculation base is the average exchange rate for 2021.
Source: Bank of Russia calculations.

RUSSIAN FINANCIAL MARKET DYNAMICS WERE DIVERSE IN JANUARY **Table 7**

Indicator		30.01.2026	1M	3M	6M	YTD	1Y
Russian financial market ('+' – positive trends, '-' – negative trends)							
RUB/USD exchange rate		76.03	2.8	4.3	5.3	2.8	22.4
MOEX Russia Index		2,783	0.6	8.8	2.0	0.6	-5.7
RTS Index		1,158	3.9	15.7	8.2	3.9	22.1
Government bond yields		14.75	30	-4	105	30	-205
Corporate bond yields		15.80	11	-110	-81	11	-719
Regional bond yields		15.59	64	-24	32	64	-471
RVI		27	-8	-14	-5	-8	-9
Exchange rates (per US dollar, % change, '+' – appreciation, '-' – depreciation)							
AEs*	US Dollar Index	98.22	-1.3	-2.5	-2.2	-1.3	-10.2
	Euro	1.17	0.9	2.5	2.4	0.9	13.9
	Japanese yen	156.48	-1.3	0.3	4.9	-1.3	-0.4
	Pound sterling	1.35	1.5	4.1	3.1	1.5	10.0
EMEs	Ruble	79.50	3.9	4.9	5.0	3.9	23.4
	Brazilian real	5.48	4.3	2.2	5.1	4.3	10.3
	Mexican peso	17.99	3.0	5.7	7.4	3.0	14.9
	Chinese yuan	7.00	0.8	2.2	3.4	0.8	4.1
	Turkish lira	42.94	-1.3	-3.6	-7.0	-1.3	-21.5
	South African rand	16.60	2.5	6.6	10.6	2.5	13.0
10Y bond yields (% p.a., change in bp, '+' – increase, '-' – decrease)							
AEs	USA	4.26	8	15	3	8	-29
	Germany	2.84	-1	20	17	-1	26
	Japan	2.24	19	60	69	19	105
	UK	4.52	4	10	0	4	-10
EMEs	Russia	14.61	18	-7	52	18	-176
	Brazil	13.44	-41	-45	-57	-41	-159
	Mexico	8.92	-3	28	-22	-3	-150
	China	1.80	-6	5	10	-6	16
	Turkey	29.76	260	15	49	260	411
	South Africa	8.04	-18	-82	-156	-18	-92
5Y CDS spreads (bp, change in bp, '+' – increase, '-' – decrease)							
AEs	USA	28	2	-8	-8	2	-3
	Germany	8	0	-1	-1	0	-6
	Japan	26	0	6	5	0	5
	UK	16	-2	-4	-1	-2	-7
EMEs	Brazil	124	-8	-9	-23	-8	-46
	Mexico	85	-1	-4	-23	-1	-38
	China	45	1	4	-1	1	-12
	Turkey	212	15	-24	-63	15	-38
	South Africa	137	2	-14	-53	2	-57
Stock indices (p, % change, '+' – increase, '-' – decrease)							
AEs	S&P 500	6,939	1.37	1.7	11.2	1.4	14.9
	Stoxx 600	611	3.07	6.3	14.0	3.1	14.4
	Nikkei 225	53,323	5.93	3.9	30.7	5.9	35.3
	FTSE 100	10,224	2.94	4.7	12.7	2.9	19.5
EMEs	MSCI EM	1,528	8.81	8.2	24.6	8.8	39.9
	Bovespa	181,364	12.56	21.9	36.9	12.6	46.9
	IPC Mexico	67,564	5.13	7.4	18.7	5.1	31.1
	SSE Composite	4,118	3.76	3.3	15.7	3.8	26.7
	BIST 100	13,838	22.88	27.7	28.8	22.9	37.3
	FTSE/JSE	120,046	3.64	9.5	22.8	3.6	40.7

* Advanced economies.
Sources: Moscow Exchange, Cbonds, Bank of Russia calculations.

EMES' STOCK INDICES CHANGED DIVERSELY IN JANUARY
(02.01.2019 = 100) **Chart 22**

STOCK INDICES OF ADVANCED ECONOMIES



STOCK INDICES OF EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES



Note. The stock indices are specified in national currencies.
Sources: Cbonds, Bank of Russia calculations.

Data cut-off dates:

- Bond market – 30 January 2026;
- Loan and deposit rates – 31 December 2025, high-frequency data – 31 January 2026;
- Credit and deposit aggregates – 1 January 2026, high-frequency data – 1 February 2026;
- Monetary aggregates – 1 January 2026, high-frequency data – 1 February 2026.

The electronic version of the information and analytical commentary is available on the Bank of Russia website.

Please send your comments and suggestions to svc_analysis@cbr.ru.

This commentary was prepared by the Monetary Policy Department.

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